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Abstract
Despite having many critics disputing value investing’s relevance today, several of the world’s
best value investors continue to deliver market-beating results almost every year. This thesis
attempts to participate in this discussion by studying two of the most prevalent value investing
philosophies. Specifically, the thesis studies whether the quality-specific investment criteria
for the defensive investor—as proposed by Benjamin Graham in The Intelligent Investor—can
deliver risk-adjusted excess returns during the investment period from 2006 to 2020. Addi-
tionally, the thesis studies whether an improved performance can be observed by creating an
investment style that blends the abovementioned, quality-specific criteria of Benjamin Graham
with Charlie Munger’s investment philosophies regarding purchasing price and holding dura-
tion.
By identifying all 36 companies that respect Graham’s quality criteria as per December 31st 2005,
11 portfolio constructions that blend Graham’s and Munger’s investment philosophies are ex-
plored. All portfolio constructions produce consistent risk-adjusted excess returns when com-
pared against a commonly accepted global benchmark. In particular, the proposed strategy—
which blends Graham’s and Munger’s investing philosophies—produces substantial excess re-
turns at a lower risk than the market provides. Nevertheless, while the results are promising,
more research must be performed on additional investment periods before a firm response can
be given to the current discussion.
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About one hundred years ago, value investing was initially developed, bringing the investor’s
attention towards buying primarily stocks in quality companies at a price below their intrinsic
value. However, the investment style was popularized after Benjamin Graham published his
book The Intelligent Investor in 1949, which is today considered as the stock market “bible”.
Hence, Graham is considered by many to be the father of value investing (Cornell, 2021; Gra-
ham and Zweig, 2006).
Since Graham popularized the field, value investing has been among the most popular, applied,
and analyzed investment styles. However, its popularity is also largely caused by Warren Buffet
and Charlie Munger’s devoted teachings—CEO and vice-chairman of Berkshire Hathaway—
for almost five decades (Klerck, 2020; Munger, 1994).
While the value investing style follows certain tenets regarding the price and quality of invest-
ments, various investment philosophies have emerged, of which Graham has developed multi-
ple. Specifically, he refined and re-defined his investment philosophy ever since he published
his first philosophy in Security Analysis in 1934 (Benjamin Graham, 1934). For instance, in
the latest edition of the Intelligent Investor—published in 1973 and modified in 2006 with com-
mentary chapters by Jason Zweig—Graham published one investing philosophy for the active,
“enterprising” investor and another for the “defensive” investor (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
In the last decades, the investment philosophy for the defensive investor has caught particular
attention among laypeople and researchers alike. The philosophy involves identifying com-
panies whose stocks meet seven criteria and then invest in any of these that fit the investor’s
preferences (Israel, Laursen, and Richardson, 2020; Soloviova, 2020).
Five of these criteria involve the quality of the company and imposes quantifiable thresholds
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for the (1) size of the enterprise, (2) earnings stability, (3) earnings growth, (4) dividend record,
and (5) strong financial condition (Graham & Zweig, 2006). These quality criteria form the
acronym SEEDS and form the foundation of the analysis in this thesis.
The following two criteria relate to the pricing, require a (6) moderate price-to-earnings ratio,
and a (7) moderate price-to-book ratio, or a trade-off between these under certain thresholds
(Graham & Zweig, 2006).
Despite delivering above-market returns in his day, Graham’s investment philosophies and ef-
fectiveness have been under scrutiny in the last decades (Israel et al., 2020; Lev and Srivastava,
2019). On the one hand, researchers and analysts find evidence both for and against Graham’s
philosophy in delivering returns that outperform certain markets and periods. But, on the other
hand, investors are branching out from Graham’s fundamental philosophy in the belief that a
modification to Graham’s philosophy will continue to perform better than the market (Berge
Larsen, Braathen, Gran, and Hundhammer, 2016; Sareewiwatthana, 2011; Zakaria and Hashim,
2017).
One such philosophy is Munger’s “Sit On Your Ass” investing philosophy that he presented
at the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting back in 2000. This philosophy largely discards
Graham’s pricing criterion as the process is more heavily focused on finding some high-quality
companies, buying them regardless of whether you get a discount on the intrinsic value or not,
and holding these investments indefinitely. Munger reasons that the compounding effect of
annual returns will dilute the extra returns earned on discounts on the intrinsic value over a
long time (Munger, 1994).
This philosophy holds some merit. Specifically, Warren Buffett is today considered by many
as the greatest investor of all time. However, he accredits a large part of his and Berkshire
Hathaway’s success to Charlie Munger’s perspectives as Munger shifted his efforts away from
the “buy low, sell high” philosophy that Graham was also accustomed to, towards a larger
focus on the “buy quality and hold indefinitely” philosophy (Buffett, 1984; Greenwald, Kahn,
Bellissimo, Cooper, and Santos, 2020a).
However, Buffett still follows (a large part of) Graham’s philosophy and has decribed The In-
telligent Investor as “By far the best book on investing ever written” (Graham and Zweig, 2006,
front page). Yet, despite the Intelligent Investor being a best-selling, critically acclaimed in-
vestment book providing easy-to-follow investment principles for the defensive investor, and
despite the fact that arguably the greatest investor of all time shifted his investment philosophy
more towards that of Charlie Munger’s, there is barely any literature that studies which per-
forms the best or if there are any superior performance effects when merging the two philoso-
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phies.
Hence, to fill this research gap, I intend to study the SEEDS criteria of Graham as a start-
ing point and compare how Graham’s and Munger’s philosophies regarding price and holding
duration perform—what I will jointly refer to as the “Graham–Munger investment styles”. Ad-
ditionally, I intend to study if any of the analyzed portfolios that are constructed from this
investing style outperform the market at large. Therefore, my research question is:
Are companies that meet Graham’s SEEDS criteria delivering a risk-adjusted ex-
cess return, and does a Graham–Munger investment style produce any improved
performance?
To date, only one non-peer-reviewed study from 2016 (Berge Larsen et al., 2016) provides
insights that contribute to answering this research question, albeit not entirely. Besides adding
a second study to the discussion on the effectiveness of the Graham–Munger investing style,
this thesis also contributes to the literature by extending upon the work of Berge Larsen et al.
(2016) with a more detailed analysis of a longer time period and a more holistic approach to the
investing process. Such an approach includes jointly analyzing the effects of portfolio filtering,
holding strategies, reinvestment strategies, and rebalancing strategies, in addition to studying
the effects caused by currency and benchmark choices.
The thesis is structured as follows. First, the relevant literature and theory are explored and de-
scribed. Second, a methodology chapter covering numerous considerations, modifications, and
additions to the theory and analysis process is provided. Third, the data analysis is provided,
split into chapters of data considerations, descriptive analysis, and exploration of the Graham–
Munger investment style. And fourth, the thesis concludes by describing its main findings,
limitations, and future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review & Theoretical
Background
This chapter gives the reader a review of the academic literature and an overview of relevant
theoretical concepts. I start by first introducing value investing—the key characteristics and
diverging value investing approaches—and highlighting the empirical findings of the academic
literature. Second, I provide an overview of relevant concepts from the modern portfolio theory,
and third, I discuss various performance measures to be considered for the empirical analysis
of this thesis.
2.1 Value Investing
While the origins of value investing date back to the late 1920s, value investing became well
known in 1949 through Benjamin Graham’s book The Intelligent Investor (Browne, 2006).
Since then, Graham is known as the father of value investing. Other well-known value investors
are David Dodd, Warren Buffett—who himself was a student of Graham—and Charlie Munger
(Greenwald, Kahn, Bellissimo, Cooper, and Santos, 2020b; Cornell, 2021).
Value investors aim to maximize stock returns by selecting stocks that appear to be trading
below their intrinsic value or book value and are, therefore, considered to be underestimated
by the stock market. These stocks are also referred to as value stocks—characterized through
a low price-to-earnings ratio, low price-to-book ratio, and high dividend yield (An, Cheh, and
Kim, 2017; Cornell, 2021). As value investors usually hold their stocks for a long-term invest-
ment horizon, they conduct a thorough financial analysis before stock selection occurs (Asness,
Frazzini, Israel, and Moskowitz, 2015; Greenwald et al., 2020b).
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However, successful value investors such as Graham and Munger also have partially deviating
investment philosophies (Graham and Zweig, 2006; Griffin, 2015). Hence, to understand better
Graham and Munger’s investment styles, their main differences are discussed next.
2.1.1 Graham’s Investing Philosophy
Graham recommends his seven stock selection criteria to the defensive investor, who is un-
willing to invest a lot of time and effort into her investment decisions and seeks conservative
investments that do not require much time and effort and is yet inexperienced with stock in-
vesting (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
The seven stock selection criteria are (1) adequate size of the enterprise, (2) sufficiently strong
financial condition, (3) earnings stability, (4) dividend record, (5) earnings growth, (6) a mod-
erate price-to-earnings ratio, and lastly (7) a moderate price-to-assets ratio. After the defensive
investor successfully identified and purchased value stocks, Graham advises keeping an asset
portfolio of around 10 to 30 stocks (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
In Graham’s eyes, investment risk represents the long-term loss of capital and not the stock
price fluctuations. Therefore, it is an intelligent investor’s responsibility to lose as little of
the money invested as possible by purchasing low-quality stocks far above their tangible value
(Klerck, 2020). Hence, Graham’s margin of safety principle—the difference between a stock’s
intrinsic value and market value—serves to analyze whether a stock is traded below or above
its intrinsic value, which overall increases the chance of earning a pleasant return on the stock
(Graham and Zweig, 2006; Scott, 1996).
If a company’s intrinsic value is lower (higher) than its stock price, the company is underval-
ued (overvalued), respectively. However, Graham never fully explained how to determine the
intrinsic value of a company and confessed that it requires substantial investment knowledge
(Graham & Zweig, 2006).
Being an intelligent investor also requires developing the emotional discipline to focus on the
fundamental characteristics of an asset and not on one’s emotions. Therefore, Graham’s stock
selection criteria help the defensive investor to train discipline, patience and develop intellec-
tually (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
2.1.2 Munger’s Investing Philosophy
Charlie Munger—Berkshire Hathaway’s vice chairman—shared his value investing philosophy
at the Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting in 2000. Compared to Graham’s value investing
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approach, Munger focuses on identifying a few outstanding companies, invests a considerable
amount of money, and then holds them preferably forever. Therefore, Munger defined his
investing philosophy as "sit on your ass investing"—beliefs that do not align with Graham’s
approach of buying undervalued stocks at a low price (Griffin, 2015; Munger, 1994).
On a talk to the students at USC Business School in 1994, Munger (1994) gave the now infa-
mous speech “A Lesson on Elementary, Worldly Wisdom As It Relates To Investment Manage-
ment & Business” in which he explained why price should not be a decisive factor:
If the business earns 6 % on capital over 40 years and you hold it for that 40 years,
you’re not going to make much different than a 6 % return—even if you originally
buy it at a huge discount. Conversely, if a business earns 18 % on capital over 20
or 30 years, even if you pay an expensive looking price, you’ll end up with a fine
result.
Overall, Munger’s "sit on your ass investing" strategy is driven by a company’s ability to suc-
cessfully compound the shareholders’ equity for an attractive rate over a long investment time
(Griffin, 2015).
While the focus of this thesis is to investigate Graham’s stock selection philosophy, Munger’s
investing approach will be explored in practice in the results chapter of this thesis to draw some
comparisons between the two super investors.
2.2 Graham’s Stock Selection Framework
In The Intelligent Investor, Graham defines seven stock selection criteria for the defensive in-
vestor, which have the objective to identify undervalued stocks that can produce higher returns
than the market (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
Graham’s stock selection criteria can be divided into two categories. The first concerns the
size of the enterprise, earnings stability, earnings growth, dividend record, and strong financial
conditions. These five criteria form the acronym SEEDS , and I will continue referring to these
criteria as the “SEEDS criteria”. Additionally, the second category consists of Graham’s price
criterion, which is the product of a low price-to-earnings ratio and a low price-to-tangible-book-
value ratio (Graham & Zweig, 2006). Both categories are described in the following pages to
give the reader a better understanding of an intelligent investor’s stock selection preferences.
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2.2.1 Size of the Enterprise
According to Graham and Zweig (2006), the first stock selection criterion adequate size of the
enterprise, requires a minimum of $100 million in annual sales for an industrial company and
a minimum of $50 million in total assets for public utilities.
2.2.2 Earnings Stability
The earnings stability criterion requires positive earnings for the common stock over the last
ten years. If, for instance, a company did not deliver positive earnings once, throughout the
past ten years, the company violated the criterion (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
2.2.3 Earnings Growth
A company would pass Graham’s earnings growth criterion if the business managed to increase
its earnings per share (EPS) by at least one-third over the past ten consecutive years. To cal-
culate the earnings growth, the intelligent investor uses a three-year average at the start and
end of the investment horizon (Graham & Zweig, 2006). A simple way to calculate the EPS,






Graham’s dividend record criterion demands dividend payments to the shareholders for 20
consecutive years. As value stocks often pay dividends, there is typically a large amount of
the value companies that have been stock-listed for at least two decades that meet this criterion
(Graham & Zweig, 2006).
2.2.5 Strong Financial Conditions
The strong financial conditions criterion requires industrial companies to have a current ratio
of at least two, meaning that the firm’s current assets are at least twice the size of the current
liabilities. Also, the long-term debt should not surpass the net current assets, of which net
current assets is defined as current assets minus current liabilities. For public utilities, however,
the debt should not be higher than twice the stock equity (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
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2.2.6 The Price Criterion
The intelligent investor’s sixth and seventh stock selection criteria are a moderate price-to-
earnings ratio and a moderate price-to-book ratio. Graham and Zweig (2006) consider the
price-to-earnings ratio as moderate if the price does not exceed 15 times the average earnings
per share of the last three years. In addition, the price-to-book ratio is approved to be moderate
if the stock price is below 1.5 times the last reported tangible book value. Graham preferred
to use the tangible book value to avoid companies with a considerable number of intangible
assets, whose value is harder to measure.
However, Graham also allows some trade-off between these two criteria if, for instance, an
earnings multiplier below 15 justifies a consequently higher asset multiplier. If the multiplier
times the price-to-book ratio does not exceed 22.5, which equals 15 times the earnings and 1.5







= 15 ·1.5  22.5 (2.2)
2.3 Empirical Findings on Value Investing
Even though various studies, among them Rani (2019) and Ye (2013), show that value investing
still delivers promising results, disbelief emerged over the years criticizing its effectiveness
(Israel et al., 2020). Lev and Srivastava (2019), for instance, argue in their paper that value
investing lost its attractiveness already 30 years ago.
According to Lev and Srivastava (2019), the two reasons that negatively affected value invest-
ing in recent years are as follows. First, accounting deficiencies led to systematically misiden-
tifying the value of a stock. And second, the economic developments over the last decades
favored the rise of growth stocks—stocks with high price-to-earnings ratios—over value stocks
(Beneda, 2002).
Oppenheimer and Schlarbaum (1981) pointed out that there is a limited amount of studies
on Graham’s value investing approach. Those available and well-researched focus on testing
Graham’s investing philosophy on stock markets in developed countries like the UK or the US.
Xiao and Arnold (2008), among others, tested Graham’s value strategy on the London Stock
Exchange from 1981 to 2005 and found that significantly positive market-adjusted returns—
annualized returns of up to 19.7 %—were achieved and explained this outcome with irrational
pricing.
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Additional studies argue that ignoring or adjusting Graham’s price criterion shows promising
results. One of these studies, for instance, argues that Graham’s stock selection criteria—
excluding the price-to-book ratio—delivered significant results in recent years (Tilley, 2016).
The other concludes that Graham’s investment strategy—when adjusting the price criterion to
a range between 70 and 300—delivers above-market annual returns of 5.5–7.7 % over eleven
years (Berge Larsen et al., 2016).
Studies on the performance of Graham’s stock selection criteria in developing countries are
somewhat limited, but those available show promising results. The main findings are summa-
rized in the following paragraphs.
The first study to highlight was conducted by Chang (2011) and emphasized that most screening
criteria proposed by Graham generated returns significantly higher than the returns of the stock
exchange in Malaysia during the years from 2000 to 2009.
The second study performed by Zakaria and Hashim (2017) investigated and tested the rele-
vance of Graham’s stock selection criteria on the Saudi Arabia stock market. This study also
identified abnormal returns in the respective stock market.
Third, Rachmattulah and Faturohman (2016) tested the validity of Graham’s stock selection
criteria on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2006 to 2015. They conclude that applying
Graham’s stock selection criteria delivered excess returns. Interestingly, stocks meeting a min-
imum of two Graham criteria delivered excess returns already with a minimum holding period
of two years.
Fourth, Sareewiwatthana (2011) studied a stock portfolio over 15 years to identify if following
Graham’s value investing strategy—by focusing on three stock selection rules—outperforms
the market in Thailand. Results showed that the portfolio significantly outperformed the re-
spective stock market. Additionally, the findings show that the value stock portfolio delivered
higher returns than the portfolio consisting of growth stocks.
Fifth, Ye (2013) studied the effectiveness of value investing in the Shanghai Stock Exchange
from 2006 to 2011 by applying, among others, three stock selection criteria from Graham—
considering Graham’s price-to-earnings ratio, dividend yield, and current ratio. Results show
that the stock portfolio delivered higher returns than the market in five out of the six years
studied.
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2.4 Modern Portfolio Theory
In 1952 Markowitz pioneered the modern portfolio theory, which focuses on how risk-averse
investors can build well-diversified asset portfolios to maximize the expected return based on a
certain level of market risk (Bodie et al., 2014; Rubinstein, 2002).
2.4.1 Beta
The beta coefficient is used in the CAPM model to measure the systematic risk of an investment
or asset portfolio compared to the entire stock market. Knowing the volatility of an investment
relatively to the market helps an investor decide whether it is worth taking the risk (Karačić and





The covariance measures the relationship of the movement between a stock’s return, ri, and
the market’s return, rM. While a positive covariance implies that the returns move together,
a negative covariance shows that the assets move reversely. The variance measures how the
market’s return, rM, moves relatively to its mean (Bodie et al., 2014).
An absolute beta value of one shows that the asset is equally volatile as the market. A beta with
an absolute value greater than one means that the stock is more volatile than the market, and
a beta with an absolute value below one implies that the stock is less volatile than the market.
Conversely, if a beta with an absolute value is negative, then the stock fluctuates opposite the
market (Bodie et al.; Hasler and Martineau, 2019).
After calculating the asset’s beta, the next question is how to construct a portfolio’s beta. The







Where N is the number of investments, and wi the investment weight of asset i.
This method, however, is problematic for portfolios that do not attempt to maintain fixed
weights of the investments. As this thesis explores many alternatives of holding and rebalanc-
ing strategies, the weights will be modified over time, and therefore, a less common approach
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to calculating the beta is relevant, namely, calculating the beta based on the portfolio returns.
For instance, Damodaran (2002, p. 120) writes
[The beta is estimated], either by taking the [weighted] average of the betas of the
individual stocks in the portfolio or by regressing the portfolio’s returns against
market returns over a prior time period...
This approach is also suggested by Chincarini and Kim (2006) and Radcliffe (1997), in which
Radcliffe (1997) defines the weighted average and the portfolio approach as beta calculations
on the component security level and the portfolio level, respectively. The portfolio level beta





A benefit of the component security level approach is that the alpha will not be artificially in-
flated. Specifically, the component security level disregards the correlation between the returns
as the asset betas are calculated without considering the other asset returns. However, the port-
folio beta studies the returns of the whole portfolio and will therefore include this correlation
effect. Hence, the volatility may present itself as higher than in the portfolio level approach
when ignoring the correlation effect in the component security level approach. Which, in turn,
increases the expected return from the investment because of a higher beta. When calculating
the Jensen’s alpha—presented in the performance measures section—against this return, the
alpha will be smaller than in the portfolio level approach (Damodaran, 2002).
Despite wanting to avoid artificially inflated results, I still choose to follow the portfolio ap-
proach for two main reasons. First, the various holding and rebalancing strategies presented in
this thesis change the weights of the investments substantially throughout the holding period.
Second, the holding strategies may trigger a reinvestment from the 2006 cohort into the local
benchmark. Therefore, investments into the index that reach a zero weighting will eventually
present themselves into the portfolio with a much higher weighting. Thus, my portfolio studies
the invested amounts in the 2006 cohort and the reinvested amounts into relevant indices. I,
therefore, consider the portfolio level calculation of beta more appropriate.
2.4.2 The Capital Asset Pricing Models
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM), introduced by Sharpe and Lintner in the 1960s, rep-
resents the emergence of the asset pricing theory and calculates the acceptable rate of return
for an investment (Bodie et al., 2014; Fama and French, 2004). The academic literature dis-
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tinguishes between three main geographical models–the traditional (local), global, and interna-
tional CAPM (Ejara, Krapl, O’Brien, & Ruiz de Vargas, 2020).
The Traditional CAPM
The traditional CAPM compares the asset return against the local market and is therefore also
known as the local CAPM (Ejara et al., 2020). Risk-averse investors hold diversified portfolios
to minimize their risk. While unsystematic risk has a negligible impact on the return of a well-
diversified portfolio, the relevant risk of such a portfolio is the systematic risk. As investors
expect a reward for waiting and taking on systematic risk through their asset investments, the
CAPM describes the relationship between the expected return of an asset and its systematic
risk. According to the CAPM, this relationship provides an evaluation of whether a stock is
valued reasonably (Bodie et al., 2014; Blitz, Falkenstein, and Van Vliet, 2014; Hasler and
Martineau, 2019).
The formula to calculate the expected return of an asset E[ri] is as follows.
E[ri] = r f +bi(E[rM]  r f ) (2.6)
The risk-free rate of return, r f , accounts for the time value of money invested in risk-free assets.
The beta of investment, bi, is a volatility measure and expresses the systematic risk relative to
the market. Moreover, the market risk premium, E[rM]  r f , is the difference between the
expected rate of return on a market portfolio E[rM] and the risk-free rate, r f (Blitz et al., 2014;
Bodie et al., 2014; Hasler and Martineau, 2019).
The expected return-beta relationship in figure 2.1 is a graphical representation of the CAPM.
The market risk premium is observed by where the asset is plotted relative to the security market
line (SML) (Bodie et al., 2014).
If a portfolio provides a return above the SML, it outperforms the market on a risk-adjusted
basis, giving a positive alpha. If the return is below the SML, the portfolio underperforms
the market, giving a negative alpha. If the portfolio is along the line—and alpha is therefore
zero—then the portfolio performs as expected given the volatility level, beta. Given the risk of
an investment, the SML provides the required rate of return, which is necessary to compensate
the investor for the risk taken and the time value of money. Therefore, the SML is used as a
benchmark to evaluate the performance of investments. For example, if a portfolio lies above
the SML, meaning it provides a higher return than expected for a certain level of volatility, then
it outperforms the market. Similarly, if a portfolio is under the SML for a given level of beta,
then the portfolio is underperforming the market (Bodie et al., 2014; Hasler and Martineau,
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2019).
Figure 2.1: The capital asset pricing model (Tamplin, 2021).
The Global CAPM
While the traditional CAPM analyses the expected return-beta relationship based on a local
market index, the global CAPM bases its analysis on the global market index such as the MSCI
World Index. The global CAPM also uses a global risk-free rate such as the 10-year US treasury
bond (Ejara et al., 2020; Villarreal, 2012). The formula for the global CAPM is as follows.
E[rGi ] = rGf +b Gi (E[rGM]  rGf ) (2.7)
In the formula, rGf represents the global risk-free rate, b Gi measures the asset’s volatility relative
to the global market, and E[rGM] is the expected rate of return on a global market portfolio.
The International CAPM
In comparison to the global CAPM, the international CAPM includes currency risk in the anal-
ysis and is considered to be conceptually superior to the global CAPM. However, the interna-
tional CAPM is also considered harder to implement, which is also the reason why the global
CAPM is used more frequently (Ejara et al., 2020). The formula for the international CAPM is
as follows.
E[rIi ] = rGf +b Gi (E[rGM]  rGf )+ gi(E[rX ]  rGf ] (2.8)
E[rX ]  rGf ] represents the risk premium of the foreign currency index, whereas gi(E[rX ]  rGf )
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represents the asset’s foreign currency risk.
2.4.3 The Efficient Frontier
The efficient frontier is known as a cornerstone of the modern portfolio theory (Buttell, 2010).
Visually, the efficient frontier draws a line through the portfolios that deliver the highest level
of return given a certain risk level (as measured by standard deviation). Hence, a rational, risk-
averse investor should only prefer portfolios along this frontier because every point below the
frontier delivers a lower return than another portfolio alternative for a given risk level (Bodie
et al., 2014; Feldman and Reisman, 2003).
Two points along the efficient frontier are particularly interesting. First is the minimum-variance
portfolio, which is the left-most portfolio on the frontier that delivers the lowest level of risk.
Second is the optimal risky portfolio, which is the portfolio that delivers the highest excess
return (as measured against the risk-free rate) per unit of risk. In other words, the optimal risky
portfolio delivers the highest Sharpe ratio. A line can be drawn from the graph’s intersect in
the risk-free rate through the optimal risky portfolio. This line is called the best possible Cap-
ital Allocation Line (CAL), and its slope equals the Sharpe Ratio. The steeper this line is, the
higher is the “reward-to-variability” ratio, and it can, for instance, help investors in choosing
how much to invest in the optimal risky portfolio and how much to invest in the risk-free asset
(Bodie et al., 2014; Feldman and Reisman, 2003).
Figure 2.2: The efficient frontier
2.4.4 Portfolio Diversification
According to modern portfolio theory, stocks face two forms of risk—systematic and unsys-
tematic risk. While the former refers to the market’s risk and is also known as non-diversifiable
14
risk, the latter describes the company-specific risk. Even when a stock is considered reasonably
priced, it still poses an unsystematic risk, which the investor can reduce by well-diversifying
the portfolio. Hence, a well-diversified portfolio is a portfolio where each asset weight is small
enough so that the unsystematic risk becomes negligible. However, the systematic risk can not
be diversified, and investors do not get compensated for bearing (Bodie et al., 2014; Biswas,
2015; Sukrianingrum and Manda, 2020).
2.4.5 Rebalancing Strategies
As mentioned in portfolio diversification, well-diversifying an asset portfolio makes unsystem-
atic risk minor. While allocating diversified assets to one’s portfolio is one step, the other is to
decide on a suitable asset holding strategy for the investment period. Generally, a fund man-
ager or investor chooses between holding the asset portfolio or rebalancing the portfolio. The
former consideration—holding the originally allocated set of assets—is referred to as buy-and-
hold strategy or no-rebalancing. The latter consideration—rebalancing—is known as active
rebalancing strategy (Dayanandan and Lam, 2015; Guastaroba, Mansini, and Speranza, 2009;
Qian, 2018).
The process of buying and selling investments of a portfolio to adjust the asset’s weighting
back to the target allocation of the portfolio is known as rebalancing (Dayanandan and Lam,
2015; Kitces, 2015). The potential and power of rebalancing to improve portfolio returns and
reduce unsystematic risk is generally acknowledged in the academic literature (Harjoto and
Jones, 2006; Tsai, 2001; Zilbering, Jaconetti, and Kinniry Jr, 2015).
The literature discusses a variety of rebalancing strategies, such as periodic rebalancing and
threshold rebalancing (Dichtl, Drobetz, and Wambach, 2016; Qian, 2018). Nevertheless, while
some empirical findings show that only quarterly or semi-annual rebalancing results in sta-
tistically significant results compared to a buy-and-hold strategy, others identified the return
difference between periodic rebalancing, such as monthly and quarterly rebalancing, and a buy-
and-hold strategy to be only marginal (Dayanandan and Lam, 2015; Rattray, Granger, Harvey,
and Van Hemert, 2020; Yu and Lee, 2011).
Dichtl et al. (2016), on the other hand, conclude that frequent rebalancing significantly ad-
vances the risk-adjusted portfolio performance in all studied markets after studying several
financial markets for 30-years. Also, Graham emphasizes in The Intelligent Investor the im-
portance of following a periodic rebalancing approach, which, according to Graham, requires
an asset weight reallocation approximately every six months (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
Moreover, there is little focus on the optimal rebalancing strategy when considering transaction
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costs as well as the optimal asset portfolio based on the asset’s risk characteristics (Masters,
2003). When considering transaction cost, as well as taxes on capital gains—which occur
when applying a rebalancing strategy—it is argued that the buy-and-hold strategy appears to
be the best way to manage one’s asset portfolio (Dayanandan and Lam, 2015; Yu, Chiou, Lee,
and Lin, 2020).
Following a buy-and-hold strategy implies holding the asset portfolio from the beginning until
the end of the investment period without adjusting any asset weights. However, a buy-and-
hold strategy can result in an asset portfolio that deviates considerably from an investor’s asset
allocation considerations and is highly concentrated and limited to a few assets (Tsai, 2001).
Hence, it might negatively affect the overall portfolio performance (Hu, Chang, & Chou, 2014).
2.5 The Efficient Market Hypothesis
In the 1970s, Fama developed the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which claims that the
stock price already reflects all information and assumes that stocks trade at their fair value
(Fama, 2021).
According to the theory, there are three variations of the EMH—the weak, semi-strong, and
strong EMH—all claiming to a certain degree that stock prices should reflect available infor-
mation (Bodie et al., 2014). The first variation, the weak EMH, affirms that stock prices already
reflect all information by studying market data such as historical stock prices or the trading vol-
ume. The weak EMH assumes that the technical analysis is ineffective for investor’s investment
decisions. However, the second variation, the semi-strong EMH, asserts that stock prices also
reflect publicly available information concerning a company’s prospects. Such information
includes historical stock prices, the quality of the management, earning forecasts, and the bal-
ance sheet composition. Therefore, if investors have access to such information from publicly
available sources, the stock prices will reflect such information. The third variation, the strong
EMH, predicates that stock prices reflect all information relevant to the firm, even including
information available only to company insiders (Bodie et al., 2014).
As information is considered as the most valuable commodity (Bodie et al., 2014), investors
have an incentive to analyze and identify new information to generate higher investment returns
than expected—what is otherwise known as outperforming the market (Grossman & Stiglitz,
1980).
However, only a few investors manage to consistently outperform the market, with Warren
Buffett being one of them (Buffett, 1984). Also, other super investors such as Graham and
Dodd have proven that the market is inefficient by taking advantage of the disparity between
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the stock’s price and value (Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway, 2005; Price and Kelly, 2004).
Buffet, for instance, stated in his article The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville, that
different investors—which he studied for almost three decades—managed to achieve excess
returns, independently from each other, by simply focusing on the differences between a stock’s
market price and its intrinsic value (Buffett, 1984). Overall, there are opposing views in the
academic literature about the EMH and its effectiveness, particularly in the context of excess
returns (Basu, 1977; Fama, 2021; Malkiel, 2005; Sewell, 2011).
2.6 Performance Measures
The academic literature presents several ratios that serve to measure the performance of a port-
folio, both adjusted and unadjusted for risk (Bodie et al., 2014). Although which metrics to
study may vary based on the investor’s objective and preferences, the metrics I consider to be
the most important to answer the research question are presented below.
2.6.1 Holding Period Return
The holding period return (HPR) is the total return earned during the investment period and
calculated as follows.
HPR =
pE   pB + cD
pB
(2.9)
Where pE is the share’s ending price, pB is the share’s beginning price, and cD is the share’s
cash dividend (Bodie et al., 2014).
2.6.2 Compounded Annual Growth Rate
The compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) is a standard measure to compare different in-
vestments by calculating each investment’s average growth. By average growth, theory means
that a fixed annual rate is calculated that will compound every time period and result in the
HPR in the final time period. The CAGR is considered the most appropriate metric to use in
this context because each period’s return is weighted equally. The formula for calculating the




where n is the number of years of the investment period (Bodie et al., 2014).
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2.6.3 Jensen’s Alpha
An investor should preferably look both at the overall portfolio return and at the associated risk
when evaluating an investment’s performance, which Jensen’s alpha helps describing. Specif-
ically, Jensen’s alpha ap is the average annual, risk-adjusted excess return of the portfolio
(Phuoc, 2018) and defined as:
ap = rp   [r f +bp(rM   r f )] (2.11)
Where rp is the realized return of the portfolio, bp is the beta of the portfolio, and rM is the
realized return of the selected market index. If alpha is positive, then the portfolio is delivering
excess risk-adjusted returns (Bodie et al., 2014).
2.6.4 Risk Premium Measures
The Sharpe ratio is a reward-to-variability ratio and the most commonly used ratio of risk-
adjusted returns. The Sharpe ratio divides the excess return (rp   r f ) by the standard deviation




Even though the Sharpe ratio is a standard risk-adjusted performance measure for a portfolio,
it holds two drawbacks. First, the ratio compares against the risk-free rate of return, which is
not necessarily a relevant benchmark when looking at market-beating portfolio performances.
Second, the Sharpe ratio looks at both systematic and unsystematic risk as well as upside and
downside volatility (Bodie et al., 2014).
The Sortino ratio is a modification of the Sharpe ratio and a better risk measure choice since
the ratio uses the downside deviation over the standard deviation. As recognized by Markowitz,
only downside deviation is relevant for the investor, which makes the use of downside deviation
as a risk measure more relevant (Rollinger & Hoffman, 2013).
The formula for the Sortino ratio is
S = r̄p r̄ fsd
Where sd is the standard deviation of the downside deviation. Moreover, two disadvantages of
the Sortino and Sharpe ratio are worth emphasizing. First, both ratios look at systematic and
unsystematic risk, ignoring that a well-diversified portfolio makes unsystematic risk negligible.
Second, the excess return is calculated against the risk-free rate and not a reference index such
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as the S&P 500 (Israelsen et al., 2005; Rollinger and Hoffman, 2013).
The Treynor ratio handles the first of these two downsides of the Sortino ratio by measuring
the excess return per unit of risk comparing only against systematic risk. According to Bodie




Since the Treynor ratio does not focus on downside volatility and uses the risk-free rate instead
of a benchmark return, these are two disadvantages to consider (Scholz & Wilkens, 2005).
2.6.5 Information Ratio
The Information ratio (IR) is another indicator for risk-adjusted returns. In comparison to the
three previously mentioned metrics, IR considers excess return as the return above the chosen
benchmark index such as the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. Also, William Sharpe recommends
using the IR ratio instead of the Sharpe ratio precisely because of this point (Israelsen et al.,
2005). According to Bodie et al. (2014), the IR is the expected excess return relatively to a
benchmark divided by the standard deviation of the excess return:
IR =
E[rp   rb]
s [rp   rb]
(2.12)
Where rb is the benchmark return.
Although there are no definite answers on what makes a good IR, Goodwin (1998) and Israelsen
et al. (2005) state that the higher the information ratio is, the better, while a negative IR means
that the portfolio did not produce excess returns.
Precisely, an IR of 0 to 0.4 is often not a good investment as the portfolio did not produce
excess returns consistently. However, an IR of 0.4 to 0.6 is a good investment, whereas an IR





Backtesting is a method that assesses how a particular investment strategy would have per-
formed ex-post (Schumann, 2018). For example, simulating the historical performance of
stocks through backtests is a common approach when studying the effectiveness of value in-
vesting (Jahan, Cheh, and Kim, 2016; Sak, 2017). I, therefore, run a backtest using data from
the Bloomberg Terminal and its equity screener, first, to identify companies, which fulfill the
SEEDS criteria, and second, to analyze how the Graham portfolio performs throughout the de-
fined investment horizon. However, when backtesting, there are three key considerations to
make.
First, it is crucial to avoid cherry-picking, which is deliberately selecting data points to help
support particular hypotheses, because it would otherwise reduce the credibility of the findings
(Schumann, 2018). By including all companies that match the SEEDS criteria per Decem-
ber 31st 2005, containing the companies that were eventually unlisted, I have avoided cherry-
picking companies for the investment strategy. For the same reason, I have deliberately chosen
to study companies for an investment period that includes the Great Recession in addition to
one of the largest “bull periods” in modern time to explore how the 2006 cohort performs both
during periods when the market delivers high returns and during periods when the market does
not.
Second, the main attributes of the investment strategy—such as to filter the SEEDS criteria and
the investment period—should be selected before looking at the historical data set. Otherwise,
there is a higher chance of overfitting to occur, which is defined as constructing a tailor-made
model that fits well with the current data set but would not perform well with other data sets
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(Bailey, Ger, de Prado, & Sim, 2015).
Third, while this thesis studies how well the 2006 cohort of Graham companies performs rela-
tive to the market, the intention is to identify how the whole investment strategy may perform
against later cohorts. Hence, in the results chapter, I study and eventually choose a pricing-,
holding-, and rebalancing strategy based on the considerations. Choosing these strategies is
essential to identify those that may likely perform well in later cohorts as well.
3.2 Assumptions
I make the following five assumptions throughout the data analysis.
First, the Bloomberg Terminal’s universe of equities is complete enough to provide the relevant
financial data. Furthermore, for companies that stop trading for whatever reason—for instance,
due to an acquisition or bankruptcy—I assume that their data is still available in the Bloomberg
terminal’s equity screener, which seems to be the case.
Second, both taxes on sales and losses as well as transaction fees are assumed to be zero. Again,
this is a commonly made assumption in modern portfolio theory (Edwin J & Martin J, 1997).
Third, I assume that the stocks can be bought and sold at the respective day’s closing price,
except January 1st 2006, in which I assume that I can buy stocks at the opening price.
Fourth, if the company stops trading for whatever reason, I assume that I can sell the stocks at
the closing price of the last day of trading. This assumption does not hold for companies that
went bankrupt because I may not sell these shares.
Fifth, I assume that the closing price on the final day of trading before a company was acquired
and unlisted represents the investors’ actual compensation as part of the acquisition. Specifi-
cally, using the closing price simplifies the analysis because an acquisition may involve cash
and stock compensation in the acquirer’s company, complicating the calculations.
3.3 The SEEDS Criteria
Graham’s seven stock selection criteria, introduced in The Intelligent Investor, serve the defen-
sive investor who seeks safety and does not actively monitor the stock prices of her investments
(Graham & Zweig, 2006). Graham’s stock selection criteria were introduced in the theory chap-
ter and lay the foundation for this thesis. However, some of Graham’s investing criteria need
some modifications and considerations, which are explained in the following pages. Criteria
21
that are not modified and need no further explanation are not covered in this section.
3.3.1 Terminology
First, companies that respect the SEEDS criteria are frequently called Graham companies. Ad-
ditionally, the companies that respect the SEEDS criteria as of December 31st 2005 are referred
to as the 2006 cohort of Graham companies.
3.3.2 Size of the Enterprise
In the commentary chapter of The Intelligent Investor, Zweig advises the defensive investor
to seek companies with a total market value of at least $2 billion in 2003 (Graham & Zweig,
2006). After inflation-adjusting the minimum requirement for 2006 by using the US inflation
calculator (Coinnews Media Group LLC, 2021), I add a minimum requirement of $2.19 bil-
lion in annual revenues for 2006 when identifying potential Graham companies through the
Bloomberg Terminal’s equity screener. To further analyze if the 2006 cohort violates the rev-
enue criterion, I use the last available annual inflation rate when a company’s annual report
was published. If the reported currency was in any other currency than USD, I converted the
revenue using the reporting date’s currency rate.
Additionally, Graham and Zweig (2006) distinguish between industrial companies and public
utilities when evaluating the enterprise size, having different criteria for each. However, the
Bloomberg Terminal’s equity screener did not have a criterion to filter for public utilities, which
complicated the data collection process. Hence, I decided to ignore the utility-specific criterion
of the enterprise size and evaluated all companies by the previously stated revenue criterion.
As a result, utility companies listed in the Bloomberg universe, which would have fulfilled all
SEEDS criteria, except the more strictly imposed revenue criterion, could not be identified and
are excluded from the analysis.
3.3.3 Earnings Growth
Graham’s earnings growth criterion requires a minimum EPS increase of 1/3 over the past ten
years. As Graham and Zweig (2006) suggests, I use a three-year average to calculate the EPS
growth. I, therefore, need 12 years of financial data to calculate the EPS growth for year ten,
which requires the last 12 annual reports published before December 31st 2005.
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3.3.4 Dividend Record
While old dividend data is traceable in the financial statements in the Bloomberg Terminal,
the equity screener does not provide data for reporting years older than a certain number of
years. Hence, no companies with 20 years of dividends will be returned when adding this
filter in the equity screener. However, although the data may exist in the Bloomberg database,
reducing this criterion from 20 to 10 years leads to a list of companies. Hence, I decide to
ease Graham’s dividend criterion to 10 years of uninterrupted dividend payments to have any
investment candidates to study.
3.4 Adjusted Closing Prices
When backtesting results, it is vital to make certain adjustments to make stock prices compara-
ble over time. Precisely, the prices should be adjusted for normal and abnormal cash dividends,
in addition to adjusting for spin-offs, stock splits/consolidations, stock dividends, and rights of-
ferings/entitlements. These price adjustments are performed automatically by the Bloomberg
L.P. (2021) by entering the DPDF command and ticking all checkboxes to account for the nec-
essary changes mentioned above. All equity and benchmark prices throughout this thesis are
therefore adjusted, although they may not necessarily be referred to as “adjusted prices”.
3.5 Price Criterion Modification
Graham recommends using a three-year trailing EPS average in the calculations because the
metric is easy to manipulate (Graham & Zweig, 2006). By the same reasoning, I would like
to modify the price-to-tangible-book-value ratio to specify that the tangible book value should
also be a three-year trailing average.
3.6 Portfolio Strategies
In the results chapter, I analyze different pricing-, holding-, and rebalancing strategies to iden-
tify a final portfolio strategy that may deliver risk-adjusted excess returns. However, it is also
important to avoid overfitting so that the final investment strategy can be applied to later co-
horts of Graham companies with hopefully similarly promising results. The following section
describes the four pricing-, four holding-, and five rebalancing strategies that I will consider
in the results chapter, in addition to currency and benchmark comparisons and how all these
alternatives are classified.
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3.6.1 The Strategy Nomenclature
With four, four, and five alternatives for the pricing-, holding-, and rebalancing strategies, re-
spectively, in total, 80 strategies are produced. Additionally, I evaluate each strategy against six
currencies and two benchmarks, which delivers 960 different results. Finally, a classifier code
is made for each of these 960 alternatives to quickly get an overview of the different alterna-
tives. The nomenclature has the structure “P#-H#-R#-#-#”, in which each hashtag is replaced
with the pricing, holding, rebalancing, currency, and benchmark identifier, respectively.
Table 3.1: The strategy nomenclature.
Price strategy Holding strategy Rebalancing strategy Currency Benchmark
P1 Graham range H1 Hold–index R1 No rebalancing LCY L Local
P2 All companies H2 Hold–portfolio R2 Annual USD G Global
P3 All excluding tails H3 Sell–index R3 Monthly NOK
P4 Max returns H4 Sell-portfolio R4 15 % threshold EUR
R5 Annual w/o low HPR CHF
GBP
An example of a name given by the strategy nomenclature is “P1–H2–R3–USD–G”. This par-
ticular strategy represents the pricing strategy “buy only companies that meet Graham’s price
criterion limit of maximally 22.5”, holding strategy “continue holding the stock when the re-
spective company violates a SEEDS criteria, but reinvest into the portfolio if it stops trading”,
and rebalance monthly. Additionally, the results are produced by first converting them to USD
as the base currency, and the returns are compared against the global benchmark. The currency
“LCY” presented in table 3.1 represents the local currency, meaning no currency conversion is
performed.
3.6.2 The Pricing Strategy
I consider four pricing strategies, and all selected companies will be invested in, considering
equal weighting. Pricing strategy P1 invests only in the companies with a positive price cri-
terion score but less than PEPS ·
P
tBV  22.5. Pricing strategy P2 invests in all companies in the
2006 cohort, whereas pricing strategy P3 invests in companies with a price criterion score in
the range [10;200].
The motivation behind analyzing P3 is that some companies in the 2006 cohort have unnaturally
low or high price criterion scores, as shown in the descriptive analysis. Underlying issues within
the companies might cause these scores that are not captured by the SEEDS criteria. Hence, I
want to analyze the 2006 cohort but excluding these potentially problematic companies.
Finally, pricing strategy P4 is a forward-looking strategy, identifying the price criterion range
that maximizes nominal returns and then invests in these companies. However, when con-
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structing the algorithm that identifies this range, it is necessary to define a minimum number of
companies to be included in this portfolio because the algorithm would otherwise identify the
single best-performing company and propose this price criterion score as the return-maximizing
range. To ensure that the portfolio is somewhat diversified, I require to invest in at least 20 com-
panies.
Moreover, when identifying P4’s return-maximizing range of the 2006 cohort, I use the average
HPR as the decision criterion. I do not adjust for currency fluctuations because I can only
study the company’s performance without any external factors affecting the results. Hence,
the selection for P4 will identify the range of the price criterion score, including at least 20
companies in which all companies between a lower and upper price criterion threshold deliver
a higher average HPR than any other pricing range containing at least 20 companies.
However, since this strategy is forward-looking, this strategy will be used for informative pur-
poses only to provide some potential guidance for further testing in later cohorts of Graham
companies. P4 will therefore not be chosen as the finally suggested investment strategy.
3.6.3 The Holding Strategy
Four holding strategies are then considered after the pool of companies to invest in is decided in
the pricing strategy. These strategies depend on two primary considerations. First, what to do
with an investment when the affiliated company violates any of the SEEDS criteria, and second,
where to reinvest the amount if a company must be removed from the Graham portfolio.
Studying the different reinvestment strategies, selling to index versus selling to the portfolio,
provides different insights.
First, reinvesting into the benchmark index makes it possible to “lock in” the excess return on
a single stock investment. Hence, this reinvestment strategy holds the benefit that it shows how
well the company’s stock outperformed the index over the investment period.
However, this reinvestment strategy is primarily relevant for informative purposes because it
is not practically relevant for a portfolio manager to reinvest funds into the benchmark index.
Therefore, the second reinvestment strategy reinvests the amounts into the portfolio. However,
the downside with this reinvestment strategy is that in this thesis, I study only one cohort of
Graham companies. Hence, I have only a few companies to reinvest into, potentially leading
the findings from this cohort of Graham companies to be highly dependent on a smaller number
of remaining companies. This concern is particularly present for holding strategy H4. Hence,
since both reinvestment strategies provide both advantages and disadvantages, I will study both
25
and, most importantly, evaluate whether the evaluated portfolios perform well across both rein-
vestment strategies.
In holding strategy H1 (Hold–Index), all investments are held throughout the investment period,
regardless of whether they violate any of the SEEDS criteria during the investment period. How-
ever, if any investments stop trading, for whatever reason, the investment amount is reinvested
into the investment’s corresponding benchmark index.
In comparison, holding strategy H2 (Hold–Portfolio) holds all investments throughout the in-
vestment period, but I put all reinvestments into the remaining portfolio. Since rebalancing
strategies are studied separately, which change the portfolio weights, I will not modify the
weights when reinvesting. Instead, I identify the weights of the remaining portfolio invest-
ments on the reinvestment date and then allocate the reinvestment amount correspondingly.
Contrary to the two previously defined holding strategies, holding strategy H3 (Sell–Index)
sells the investment on the first date the company reports to have violated any SEEDS criteria.
For the “sell” strategies, it is essential to highlight that I did not allow re-entry into the Graham
portfolio even when a company that violates at a certain point in time fulfilled all SEEDS criteria
at a later point in time. If reinvestments must be made, either because any SEEDS criteria were
violated or if the stock stopped trading, then the remaining investment amount is reinvested
into the corresponding benchmark index.
Finally, holding strategy H4 (Sell–Portfolio) sells the investment when the corresponding com-
pany violates any SEEDS criteria for the first time. Similarly to holding strategy H2, the rein-
vestment amounts are allocated to the portfolio and do not change the remaining portfolio’s
weights. However, if all investments are eventually sold during the investment period, then
there are no more companies in the portfolio. If this situation occurs, then the investment
amount is invested into the benchmark index.
3.6.4 Rebalancing
After the pool of investments is selected from the pricing strategy and a relevant holding strat-
egy is picked, I then analyze the selected portfolio against five rebalancing strategies. To re-
balance is essential because, without portfolio rebalancing, the risk profile at the end of the
investment period may be markedly different from the risk profile at the start of the investment
period (Beach & Rose, 2005). The five studied rebalancing strategies are defined as follows.
First, rebalancing strategy R1 involves no rebalancing to gain a further understanding of the
rebalancing bonus. Then, I study three rebalancing strategies that are common in the literature
26
(Zilbering et al., 2015). These are annual (R2), monthly (R3), and threshold (R4) rebalancing.
R2 is rebalanced on December 31st each year, R3 is rebalanced on the last day of the month,
and R4 triggers a rebalancing whenever the sum of the remaining portfolio investments deviates
from their pre-specified targets by at least 15%. Then on the date that this threshold rebalance
is triggered, the remaining portfolio, potential reinvestments into the index, and the benchmark
comparison are all reinvested.
Moreover, pricing strategy P3 was motivated because there may be some underlying problems
with selected investments that the SEEDS criteria may not capture. By the same reasoning,
it is relevant to rebalance all investments except for the worst-performing companies. That
way, if any investments continuously perform poorly, then the rebalancing strategy R5 will not
continue to pour money into these poor performers. Hence, rebalancing strategy R5 rebalances
annually but excludes rebalancing the bottom quarter of investments that has delivered the worst
HPR—including past reinvestments and rebalancing—on the rebalancing date.
If reinvestments in the index have previously occurred on the date of rebalancing—primarily
because the holding strategy involves reinvesting into the index—then rebalancing will not
move invested amounts from the index reinvestments back to the portfolio or vice versa. In-
stead, on the rebalancing date, I identify the benchmark of each company that was sold to
decide the target weights among the index investments and then rebalances accordingly. For
example, if two US companies and one Norwegian company have been sold and the sales pro-
ceeds were reinvested into the index, then the target weight should be 2/3 of the US companies’
reference index and 1/3 of the Norwegian company’s reference index.
3.7 Choice of Benchmarks and Risk-Free Rates
When evaluating the 2006 cohort against an alternative, two alternatives are particularly rele-
vant. The first is to compare the portfolio performance against the risk-free rate, which I have
calculated as the average risk-free rate over the whole investment period. Here, the Sharpe,
Sortino, and Treynor ratios are three candidates. But, since a portfolio manager should rather
be compared against an investment alternative with a similar risk profile, using a risk-free rate
to evaluate the performance of the 2006 cohort is not advisable because this portfolio involves
substantially more risk than a risk-free alternative. Hence, the Sharpe ratio will only be used to
in relation to the efficient frontier, whereas the Sortino and Treynor ratio will not be reported at
all.
Instead, it is common practice to compare a portfolio against a reference index, of which the
traditional CAPM model may use a local stock exchange’s benchmark index while the global
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CAPM model uses a globally constructed stock index.
However, since the 2006 cohort includes companies from multiple countries, particular con-
cerns must be made when constructing the index and the risk-free rate metrics for the traditional
CAPM model. I chose to solve this by constructing a weighted average of the country represen-
tation, making it easier to compare the Graham portfolio against an investment’s peers within
the same economy while evaluating a whole portfolio’s performance against one benchmark.
For instance, pricing strategy P2 involves investing in all 36 companies in the 2006 cohort.
I gathered each of the ten countries’ market returns and risk-free rates, and a weighting was
based on how often companies in the investment portfolio represented countries on the first day
of trading. Since the USA is represented 21 times, for example, then 21/36 of the S&P 500 and
10-year Treasury bond performance will be used to calculate the market return and risk-free
rate. I applied this process for all countries represented in the portfolio until the sum of the
weights equal one.
These constructed weights will work as target weights that decide both the initial benchmark
investments and the weights to achieve after rebalancing. Otherwise, market fluctuations may
make the benchmark investments deviate from these target weights.
Compared to the traditional CAPM, calculating a benchmark and a reference index is more
straightforward for the global CAPM model. Using the 10-year US Treasury rate is common
when choosing the global risk-free rate. I, therefore, continue this practice.
When choosing a global benchmark, several candidates emerge as commonly used global
benchmarks (Justin, 2021). These benchmarks are the MSCI ACWI Index, MSCI World In-
dex, FTSE All-World Index, the S&P Global 100 Index, the S&P Global 1200 Index, and the
Dow Jones Global Titans 50. Choosing the correct benchmark is critical because the maximal
difference in HPR may differ substantially over time. For instance, figure 3.1 illustrates that
the most considerable HPR difference across any pair of benchmarks is almost 30 percentage
points by 2020.
While multiple global benchmarks are chosen, it is prevalent for mutual funds to compare
themselves against either the MSCI ACWI Index or the MSCI World Index—both “all-world”
indices that include and exclude emerging markets.
With a correlation of 99.8%, these markets fluctuate almost synchronously, and the differences
in HPR are minor. As figure 3.2 illustrates, the MSCI ACWI Index outperforms the MSCI
World Index by almost 500 basis points during the entire investment period, whereas the MSCI
World Index outperforms the MSCI AWCI Index by at most about 650 basis points during the
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investment period.
Even though the MSCI ACWI Index appears to be more commonly used among mutual funds
in recent years than the MSCI World Index, I still decide to use the MSCI World Index as a
benchmark for two main reasons. First, the 2006 cohort, consisting of 36 Graham companies,
has a low emerging-market exposure with only two companies from emerging market, namely
Malaysia and Hong Kong. Hence, studying an index without emerging markets is more rele-
vant. Second, the final HPR of the MSCI World Index is 515 basis points higher than that of
MSCI ACWI. Hence, I avoid artificially inflating the excess return performance of the portfo-
lio if I choose a higher-performing benchmark. Therefore, the MSCI World Index will also be
referred to as the global benchmark throughout this thesis.
Figure 3.1: Largest absolute differ-
ence of global benchmarks.
Figure 3.2: Cumulative difference
between the MSCI ACWI and
MSCI World indices.
3.8 Currency Choice
In the international CAPM model, currency risk is also implemented with a currency risk es-
timator gi. As I study an international portfolio, I consider it relevant to study how a choice
of a base currency affects the performance of the final chosen portfolio strategy. This could,
for instance, be relevant if I intend to establish a mutual fund in a selected country and need to
convert stock values denominated in other currencies to the currency of the country I would be
operating the mutual fund. However, instead of estimating the currency risk as the international
CAPM model does, I will instead implement the currency rates directly into all calculations and
then study how the nominal returns are affected by choice of a base currency. However, in the




While every performance metric provides helpful information, none provides the complete pic-
ture of how well a portfolio performs. In the following chapters, I apply a range of these metrics
to understand portfolio performance fully. While I defined some metrics in the theory chapter,
the others I define in the following sections. Additionally, I present some considerations and
modifications to the metrics described in the theory chapter.
3.9.1 Annual and Annualized Return
Throughout the next chapters, I often refer to the terms “annualized return” and “annual return”.
By annualized return, I mean CAGR, whereas annual return means the value appreciation an
investment or the portfolio had in a single year from January 1st to December 31st . The average
annual return refers to the average annual returns over the full investment period from 2006 to
2020.
Furthermore, I only study nominal returns and discard real returns. The reason is twofold. First,
to limit the scope of the thesis, and second, inflation numbers of all countries represented in the
2006 cohort were not available in the Bloomberg Terminal for the entire investment period.
3.9.2 Beta Considerations
When calculating the beta, a relevant question is whether to calculate the beta using daily,
weekly, monthly, or annual returns. Daily returns are often not recommended because they
may have a lot of noise (Gilbert, Hrdlicka, Kalodimos, & Siegel, 2014), whereas annual data
may provide too few data points to provide a reasonable beta estimation. Therefore, weekly or
monthly data is often preferred (Momcilovic, Begovic, & Tomasevic, 2014).
Another relevant question to ask when calculating the beta is the period the beta should be
calculated over. If the time period is short, only a few data points may be used when estimating
the beta. However, if the beta calculation is for a company, and if the time period is long, then
the company may be markedly different from the beginning of this time period. This would
consequently make the beta estimate inaccurate compared to today’s actual beta.
Moreover, because of a need to have a beta value that reflects an asset’s current actual beta, a
third relevant question to ask is whether a rolling beta should be applied.
A beta calculation is based on historical volatility against the market. Since I invest only once
on January 1st 2006, it is relevant to study the estimated beta of this investment date. As I am
more interested in the volatility of the investments during the investment period, I am more
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interested in studying the beta when I sell the investments on December 31st 2020. Hence, I do
not implement a rolling beta but rather study the beta estimate on the last date of the investment
horizon.
Additionally, Pham et al. (2020) identified that using a medium-horizon time period of 12 years
gave a better model fit and a lower standard deviation of the beta coefficient than a shorter time
horizon of three years. I, therefore, apply this finding in the analysis. However, since the
investment period in this thesis is 15 years, which is only 20 % longer than the horizon studied
by Pham et al. (2020), I apply one beta calculation for the whole investment period of 15 years
instead.
Furthermore, the literature discusses the importance of studying an adjusted beta because an
asset is assumed to move closer towards the market’s volatility over time, resulting in a beta of
one. Because I choose to calculate the beta for the investment period, I consider the basic beta
calculation sufficient. However, as mentioned in the theory chapter, I calculate the beta on a
portfolio return level instead of on a component security level.
3.9.3 Information Ratio Considerations
I primarily focus on the information ratio instead of the Sharpe, Sortino, and Treynor ratios
because they compare against a risk-free rate instead of a benchmark like the IR does. When
calculating the IR, I use monthly returns of both the investments and the benchmark compari-
son.
3.9.4 Holding Period Return
In section 2.6.1 on page 17, theory defines HPR to include cash dividends cd . However, since
I use adjusted prices throughout the thesis, which accounts for cash dividends in the prices, I





3.9.5 Holding Period Excess Return
When studying the portfolio results, the investment’s holding period return is relevant and
presented in the theory section. Similarly, how well the portfolio performed on an aggregate
level against the benchmark is useful. Hence, the metric is beneficial for an investor to quickly
see how well a portfolio performed over the entire investment period without compounding the
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annual differences. I define the holding period excess return as
HPER = HPRP  HPRM. (3.2)
HPRP is the portfolio’s holding period return, and HPRM is the benchmark’s holding period
return.
3.9.6 DCAGR
A downside of using HPR and HPER, is that the results depend on the investment period.
CAGR, which I presented in the theory chapter is a better approach. I define DCAGR as follows.
DCAGR =CAGRp  CAGRM (3.3)
Where CAGRp and CAGRM is the portfolio’s and benchmark’s annualized return, respectively.
3.9.7 Cumulative Outperformance Ratio
A downside of using the HPR is that it gives a valuable metric for one single day only. However,
when evaluating mutual funds’ past performance, the interested investor may also wish to study
a graph illustrating day-by-day HPR and analyze by how much the portfolio outperforms the
market to identify its performance consistency. This calls for a metric that allows the investor to
quickly examine the ratio of days in the investment period in which the portfolio has delivered










In formula (3.4), HPRPd represents the portfolio’s HPR on day d, HPR
M
d the benchmark’s HPR
on day d, and D the number of days in the investment period. Hence, HPRpd>HPRMd takes the
value 1 if the portfolio’s HPR outperforms the benchmark’s HPR on a given day and 0 if it does
not.
3.9.8 Annual Outperformance Ratio
When mutual funds, in particular, report their past performance, it is common to show a table
with a year-by-year comparison of the fund’s performance against the benchmark. Berkshire
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Hathaway, for instance, always presents this table on the first page of their annual investor
letters (Buffett, 2021).
The reader cares primarily about whether the fund’s result is positive or negative, and then by
how much and how often the fund is performing better than the benchmark. This need calls
for an easily interpretable metric, which calculates for how many percent of the investment
period years the portfolio’s annual return was higher than the benchmark’s annual return—or,








In formula (3.5), aPt represents the portfolio’s annual return in year t, aMt the benchmark’s
annual return in year t, and n the number of years in the investment period. Hence, aPt >aMt
takes the value 1 if the portfolio outperforms the benchmark in a given year and 0 if it does not.
3.9.9 Maximum and Minimum Asset Weight
To understand how exposed the portfolio is to the individual investments, I present the max-
imum and minimum asset weight in the results chapter. This metric shows the highest and
lowest weight, respectively, that any investment had at any point during the investment period.
This metric, however, studies only the investments made from the 2006 cohort and does not
consider potential index reinvestments.
3.9.10 Rebalancing Bonus
Since I study rebalancing strategies, studying how much extra return rebalancing alone provides
the portfolio is essential. Hence, I define the rebalancing bonus (RB) metric as follows.
RBp,h,r =CAGRp,h,r  CAGRp,h,R1 (3.6)
In this context, RBp,h,r represents the rebalancing bonus for the portfolio following pricing
strategy p, holding strategy h, and rebalancing strategy r. Similarly, CAGRp,h,r represents
the CAGR, which is achieved for the exact pricing–holding–rebalancing strategy p, h, and






This thesis aims to study the stock performance of the selected Graham companies over an
investment period of 15 years. I made several considerations when selecting which time period
to study. First, it is preferable to have a longer investment period to study because short-term
returns are driven more by market psychology than by the company’s fundamentals (Graham
& Zweig, 2006). Second, it is preferable to have an investment period that includes both good-
and poor-performing market periods, so-called bull and bear periods. I, therefore, included
the Great Recession in the investment period. Third, the used database collects the relevant
financial information to have sufficient data to identify companies respecting the SEEDS criteria.
The database of the Bloomberg Terminal, which I used for the data collection, however, has
substantial missing data in the years before, around 1995. Also, I needed to collect data for
at least ten years before starting the investment period, in 2006, which was the earliest year
that matched all three criteria. Berge Larsen et al. (2016) had similar reasoning and experience
when choosing the starting date of their investment period in their analysis.
The investment horizon of 15 years starts on January 1st 2006 and ends on December 31st 2020.
As the analysis of the Graham stocks starts on the first day of 2006, which is the day they are
purchased at the opening price, it requires investigating the stocks the day before, on December
31st 2005. The stocks are therefore purchased at the opening price on January 1st 2006, which
is equivalent to the closing price on December 31st 2005.
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4.2 Data Collection
This thesis analyzes the performance of Graham companies, which fulfill the SEEDS criteria at
the beginning of 2006 and I define the set of Graham companies as the 2006 cohort. I decided
to only analyze the 2006 cohort to limit the scope of the thesis. Potentially promising results
from this thesis will, therefore, lay a foundation for future research in which more cohorts can
be tested based on the findings from the 2006 cohort.
The financial data was collected using the Bloomberg Terminal. Since the Bloomberg database
has a generous amount of stock information, this thesis uses the data from this source (Bloomberg
L.P., 2021). However, since I only used the Bloomberg Terminal to identify companies respect-
ing the SEEDS criteria, I may miss companies that would have qualified as Graham companies
but are not listed in the Bloomberg universe.
The 2006 cohort was identified using the Bloomberg Terminal’s equity screener (Bloomberg
L.P., 2021). Even though it was not possible to add all of the SEEDS criteria to the screener, the
screener allowed identifying a set of companies, which fulfilled a subset of the SEEDS criteria.
Then further analysis was performed in R to identify which of the companies respected the
remaining criteria.
After identifying the 2006 cohort, the next step was to gather the financial reports from the
last available reporting year on December 31st 2005 up until December 31st 2020. For some
companies, this involved starting with the FY2004 annual report, whereas other companies had
already published their FY2005 annual report at the end of 2005 because they use a different
accounting period than the Gregorian calendar. If multiple accounting styles and reports were
available in the Bloomberg Terminal, the mixed accounting style of the consolidated annual
report was always used when available.
If a company was listed on multiple stock exchanges, then the main listing and corresponding
adjusted daily closing prices were collected using the Bloomberg Terminal’s GP command and
exported to Excel files. In addition, all prices were collected in the local currency (LCY) and
then converted with daily currency prices in R if a strategy applied a specific currency.
Additionally, for every 2006 cohort company, the main stock listing and a relevant local bench-
mark were identified. Together with global benchmark prices, the closing prices of all local
benchmarks were also collected with the GP prices and exported to Excel.
Finally, if companies stopped trading during the investment period, the dates on which they
stopped trading were recorded manually by checking the company announcements in the
Bloomberg Terminal. Then, the invested amounts were sold on the closing prices of their
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final trading dates. Although the closing price may not represent the final compensation the
investors received on this final price, who may both have received a cash and stock compensa-
tion in another stock listing, I still consider the closing price a good approximation and easier
to analyze.
4.3 Data Processing
After collecting the data from the Bloomberg Terminal, I processed the data of the actual 2006
cohort in R.
In total, over 6000 lines of code handle the entire process, from reading in the inputs from the
Excel files that the Bloomberg Terminal produced to producing the results, tables, and different
plots.
The code first structures benchmark, currency, and equity data by processing the data from
Excel sheets to lists in R. Dates with missing prices due to closing dates are replaced with
previous closing day’s prices to have prices for every day of the investment period. It is also
registered when a particular company stops trading if it is unlisted from the stock exchange
during the investment period.
For equities, each annual report is then read from Excel files and converted into lists in R listing
data points, which are used for further analysis. Examples of data points, in addition to numer-
ical performance values, are the publication date of the annual report and logical True/False
parameters whether each Graham criteria was preserved or violated.
4.3.1 Portfolio Analysis
I conduct the portfolio analysis through a function. I provide the function five arguments
through equally many for-loops: the price strategy, the holding strategy, the rebalancing strat-
egy, the currency, and the benchmark to use in the analysis. Since each argument has four, four,
five, six, and two options, the loop runs in total 960 times.
Inside the portfolio analysis function, an initial investment pool of companies will be chosen
based on the pricing strategy. Then a for loop is run across every day in the investment period
from January 1st 2006 until December 31st 2020.
Which companies are still in the investment pool are identified for every day. A company may
be eliminated from the pool either if it stops trading or because it violates the criteria set by
the chosen holding strategy. Furthermore, the value of the investments is updated daily. This
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process includes updating the values of the remaining investments in the 2006 cohort for the
total portfolio values. Moreover, if the holding strategy was to reinvest sales into the reference
index, these values are also re-calculated and added to the total portfolio value. Finally, the
benchmark values are updated. If any currency besides the local currency (LCY) is chosen in
the strategy, then all values are also converted to the chosen currency, which may appreciate or
depreciate the total values.
Selling the amounts invested into a company and reinvesting the amounts elsewhere may occur
for any of the two following reasons. First, the company may stop trading on the date that is
analyzed. Second, if the company violates any SEEDS criteria on the analyzed date and the
holding strategy is to sell upon violation, then a reinvestment is triggered. As a result, the sales
proceeds are reinvested either into the portfolio or the chosen index, depending on the analyzed
holding strategy.
If a company is sold because it violates the SEEDS criteria, it is not accepted back into the port-
folio even though it meets all SEEDS criteria again at a later point. Furthermore, if a reinvest-
ment is triggered, the amount is reinvested into the corresponding index if the holding strategy
involves reinvesting the amounts into the index. Additionally, if reinvestment is triggered, the
holding strategy involves reinvesting into the portfolio, and if there are no remaining assets in
the investment portfolio, then the total amount is invested into the index instead.
At the end of the day loop, the rebalancing rule is evaluated. If the rule is triggered, then the
Graham investments, index investments, and benchmark investments are all rebalanced. How-
ever, the Graham and index investments are rebalanced separately, meaning that amounts will
not be moved from the index investments to the remaining Graham companies or vice versa.
The threshold rebalancing is triggered by the portfolio of Graham investments only, meaning
that the portfolio, index, and benchmark are all rebalanced simultaneously if the portfolio trig-
gers the threshold.
After the day loop has ended, the outputs are then finally produced for further analysis and to
produce various plots and tables.
4.4 Further Data Cleaning and Considerations
After collecting the financial data from the Bloomberg Terminal, the next step is to clean the
data set to lay the foundation for the data analysis. For the data cleaning process, the following
considerations are important to highlight.
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4.4.1 EPS
Adjusted EPS data were used wherever they are available because I believe removing extraor-
dinary events will more closely reflect the company’s EPS growth. If the adjusted EPS is not
available from the Bloomberg Terminal’s annual reports for certain years, then I use the basic
EPS for those years instead.
4.4.2 Tangible Book Value
Although a positive tangible book value is not a requirement for any of the SEEDS criteria,
Graham’s price criterion works only for companies with a positive tangible book value. Hence,
I excluded all companies with a negative tangible book value in the last annual report published
before December 31st 2005.
4.4.3 Trailing Averages for EPS and Tangible Book Value
To calculate the EPS growth over ten years—as required by one of the SEEDS criteria—twelve
years of EPS data is needed. However, a few companies had financial data available for only
ten or eleven annual periods before December 31st 2005. Even though these companies met
all other SEEDS criteria, they were disqualified because of missing EPS data for the 12th year.
To avoid excluding these companies from the Graham cohort, I allowed the three-year trailing
average to be calculated only on the available data—regardless of whether one, two, or three
data points were available. This choice was taken before studying the investment period perfor-
mance of the affected companies to avoid cherry-picking investments. The same consideration
was performed for the three-year trailing tangible book value calculation.
4.4.4 Updated Annual Reports
In the Bloomberg database, only the latest update date of an annual report was available. Thus,
if companies made changes to an annual statement after the original publishing date, the latest
update date will be the latest announcement date. If, for instance, the latest update has been
made later than one year of the original announcement date, together with publishing the fol-
lowing annual report, then I end up with multiple annual statements showing the same year in
their announcement date. This was the case with Hennes & Mauritz in 2006, for instance. Al-
though there were only a few of these instances, the R code assumed that the latest update was
the day and month of the original publishing date, and I then updated the year to the original
year. By following this approach, I was able to preserve Graham companies in 2006 despite
missing data points.
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4.4.5 Exclusion of Companies Meeting the SEEDS Criteria
During the cleaning process, I identified that the Bloomberg Terminal’s equity screener iden-
tified a few companies as Graham companies in 2006 even though they did not trade at the
beginning of 2006. While they were stock listed after January 1st 2006, their financial data
for the previous ten years—from December 31st 1995 to December 31st 2005—however, was
available in the Bloomberg universe. Therefore, the equity screener proposed these companies
as potential candidates for the 2006 cohort. I excluded these companies from the cohort since
it was not possible to invest in these companies on January 1st 2006.
4.4.6 A Special Case on Sears
The companies’ stock prices throughout the investment period have been gathered based on
their primary stock listings. Usually, the stock prices of delisted companies are available in the
Bloomberg database up until the unlisting date. However, one company of the 2006 cohort—
Sears—was delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange on July 28th in 2017 BNN Bloomberg
(2017), but for an unknown reason, the Bloomberg database did not offer any stock prices of
Sears’ main listing in Toronto any longer. As Sears’ stock was still trading in the US market, the
US stock prices have been used for the analysis and converted into Canadian dollar to represent
the Sears listing. Although I could potentially have removed Sears from the 2006 cohort due
to missing data, it was important to include Sears because it performed poorly throughout the




This chapter seeks to describe and summarize the data set to gain valuable insights from the
2006 cohort and the SEEDS criteria.
5.1 The 2006 Cohort
After screening the companies’ financial data, 36 companies passed the SEEDS criteria on De-
cember 31st in 2005. This set of Graham companies, as table 5.1 shows represent the cohort of
2006 as the individual stocks were purchased on January 1st in 2006.
Table 5.1: The companies in the 2006 cohort of Graham companies.
ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc. (Canada) Nomura Research Institute Ltd. (Japan)
Barratt Developments PLC (United Kingdom) Novo Nordisk A/S (Denmark)
Becton Dickinson and Co (USA) Orkla ASA (Norway)
Brown-Forman Corp (USA) Parker-Hannifin Corp (USA)
Centex LLC (USA) Persimmon PLC (United Kingdom)
Cintas Corp (USA) PPB Group Bhd (Malaysia)
Esprit Holdings Ltd. (Hong Kong) PulteGroup Inc. (USA)
H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB (Sweden) Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co (USA)
Harley-Davidson Inc. (USA) Rohm Co Ltd. (Japan)
Illinois Tool Works Inc. (USA) Sears Canada Inc. (Canada)
Intel Corp (USA) SEB SA (France)
Kate Spade & Co LLC (USA) Secom Co Ltd. (Japan)
Kellwood Co LLC (USA) Taylor Wimpey PLC (United Kingdom)
Leggett & Platt Inc. (USA) Thor Industries Inc. (USA)
MDC Holdings Inc. (USA) UFP Industries Inc. (USA)
Medtronic PLC (USA) Vulcan Materials Co (USA)
Molex LLC/US (USA) Wilson Bowden Ltd. (United Kingdom)
NIKE Inc. (USA) WW Grainger Inc. (USA)
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As figure 5.1 shows below, the 2006 cohort can be split into two groups. The uppermost line
represents the number of companies that are still listed and possible to buy and sell on the stock
exchange each year. This line falls gradually from 36 companies in 2006 to 29 companies in
2020. However, the lowermost line represents the number of tradeable companies that still
respect the SEEDS criteria each year. This number falls sharply during the Great Recession,
and only two companies respect all SEEDS criteria between 2012 and 2015, with no companies
respecting all criteria by the end of 2020. This observation is critical to keep in mind for the
two holding strategies that involve selling the investments when the affiliated companies violate
any SEEDS criteria.
Figure 5.1: Tradeable and SEEDS -respecting companies per year.
Table 5.2 below provides a numerical representation of the number of Graham companies vio-
lating the SEEDS criteria for the first time. Most violating understandably occurred during the
Great Recession. However, had readmission been allowed when respecting all SEEDS criteria
again, the number of investments would have been higher as multiple companies re-met the
criteria during the investment period.
Table 5.2: Number of first SEEDS violations per year.
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010–2011 2012 2013–15 2016 2017-19 2020
14 5 7 4 1 2 0 1 0 1
5.1.1 Country Exposure
The portfolio of Graham companies consists of 36 companies at the beginning of the investment
period. Of these, 21 are stocks listed in the USA, which gives the 2006 cohort a considerable
exposure towards the US stock market. The remaining 15 companies are stock listed across
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UK (4), Japan (3), Canada (2), Denmark (1), France (1), Hong Kong (1), Malaysia (1), Norway
(1), and Sweden (1). By the end of 2008, the number of companies reduced to 10, of which 7
were stock listed in the USA, and 1 company each in Norway, Sweden, and Hong Kong. By
2016, this list consisted only of one American company, which continued until 2020.
5.1.2 Sector Exposure
The sector classification of Morningstar (2011) divides the stock market into the three super-
sectors cyclical, defensive, and sensitive. While the cyclical supersector is strongly sensitive to
the business cycles, the defensive supersector is generally not. The third supersector, sensitive,
shows moderate correlations with the different business cycle phases (Morningstar, 2011).
When classifying the Graham portfolio into the three supersectors, figure 5.2 shows that the
majority of Graham companies (21) is considered to be cyclical. Considering the cyclical su-
persector, 16 Graham companies are categorized as consumer cyclical, four as basic materials,
and one as a real estate business. The second-highest number of Graham companies (9) is the
sensitive supersector. Out of those nine Graham companies, six are industrial businesses and
three tech businesses. The defensive supersector has the third-highest number of Graham com-
panies (6). Of which, half are consumer defensive, and the other half are healthcare businesses.
No financial services, utilities, communication services, and energy businesses were accepted
into the 2006 cohort.
Figure 5.2: Sector overview of Graham companies.
5.2 The SEEDS Criteria
This section first analyzes the reasons for violating the SEEDS criteria throughout the investment
period, followed by analyzing the individual SEEDS criteria—the enterprise’s size, earnings
stability, earnings growth, dividend record, and a sufficiently strong financial condition. In
addition, a short descriptive analysis is given to Graham’s price criterion, which is taken out
from the main analysis. Finally, for each criterion, the analysis counts the companies that
re-respect a criterion after violating it.
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5.2.1 Size of the Enterprise
A company fulfills Graham’s first criterion, adequate size of the enterprise, if it generates annual
sales of at least $2 billion (Graham & Zweig, 2006), inflation-adjusted from 2003. Table 5.3
shows that the 2006 cohort was largely unaffected in this criterion during the first part of the
Great Recession but was more heavily affected in the later period. However, after the Great
Recession, the number of companies meeting this criterion remained stable throughout the
investment period.
Table 5.3: The number of companies meeting the revenue criterion, regard-
less of whether they have previously violated any SEEDS criteria or not.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010-2011 2012 2013-17 2018 2019 2020
36 35 34 26 21 20 19 18 19 20 22
Moreover, figure 5.3 examines the nominal revenue increase relative to each company’s 2005
level. The figure shows that the companies that still respected all SEEDS criteria in a given
year generally had a consistent increase in revenues. Additionally, in only two instances, any
SEEDS criteria-respecting company delivered lower revenues than in 2005—Barratt Develop-
ments PLC in 2006 (97.9 % of the 2005 level) and Centex LLC in 2007 (93.4 % of the 2005
level).
For the companies that had already violated any SEEDS criteria, however, the variation in rev-
enue is much greater, ranging from a substantially lower revenue compared to the 2005 level
to a substantially higher level. Over the years, the median relative revenue level is generally
higher for the remaining SEEDS -respecting companies than those who already violated any
of these criteria. However, this comparison should not be emphasized too much since only
two companies respected the SEEDS criteria from 2012 onwards. Nevertheless, the box plot
indicates that it may typically be a revenue decrease rather than an increased inflation-adjusted
revenue criterion that is the main reason why the revenue criterion was violated.
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Figure 5.3: Scaled revenues per year.
5.2.2 Earnings Stability
The earnings stability criterion requires companies to deliver profits for at least ten consecutive
years. Table 5.4 provides an overview of the Graham cohort of 2006 and how many companies
fulfilled this criterion throughout the 15 years investment horizon.
Table 5.4: The earnings stability criterion.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 n Mean Min
2005 36 36 10.00 10
2006 35 1 36 9.97 9
2007 34 1 0 35 9.97 9
2008 26 6 0 0 32 9.81 9
2009 21 5 6 0 0 32 9.47 8
2010 20 6 2 3 0 0 31 9.39 7
2011 20 4 2 3 2 0 0 31 9.19 6
2012 19 5 0 4 1 2 0 0 31 9.00 5
2013 18 5 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 31 8.87 4
2014 18 4 1 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 30 8.87 4
2015 18 3 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 30 8.83 4
2016 18 3 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 30 8.83 4
2017 18 3 2 3 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 30 8.83 4
2018 19 2 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 30 9.00 6
2019 20 2 4 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 9.31 6
2020 22 1 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 29 9.41 5
Interestingly, the weighted mean ranged from 8.83 to 10 years of profits in the last ten years
throughout the entire investment period. This high average means that the companies in general
performed consistently well in delivering profits, also during the years of the Great Recession.
For instance, the year with the highest frequency of companies with less than eight years of
profits was 2012–2018, with only seven companies. Thus, while over half of the companies
deliver profits in ten out of the last ten years throughout the investment period, the other half
that delivers occasional losses do so mostly once or twice in ten years.
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5.2.3 Earnings Growth
Graham’s earnings criterion requires an EPS growth of one-third over the past ten years. Fig-
ure 5.4 differentiates between the companies fulfilling the SEEDS criteria in the left box plot,
the companies previously violated any of the SEEDS criteria in the middle box plot, and all
companies in the right box plot.
In the left plot, the companies show a continued increase in EPS growth over time until 2012,
from which there were only two companies left in the portfolio. However, the companies that
had violated any of the Graham criteria generally delivered a gradually worse EPS growth over
time. However, it is essential to highlight that the median EPS growth is higher than one-third
every year, meaning that the median company still meets the EPS growth criterion. Neverthe-
less, a substantial difference in EPS growth is observed for the companies that continue to meet
the SEEDS criteria compared to those that do not, although statistical tests should be conducted
to say if this difference is statistically significant.
Figure 5.4: The earnings growth criterion.
However, the EPS growth metric can be misleading. Specifically, the primary purpose of the
metric is to analyze whether a company is capable of increasing its profits over time or not, but
increased EPS growth could also be achieved because the comparison metric—which is EPS
achieved ten years ago—had an underperforming year.
Table 5.5: EPS vs. EPS growth.
Increasing growth Decreasing growth
Increasing EPS 39% 30%
Decreasing EPS 8% 23%
Table 5.5 studies this point in more detail by identifying the potential underlying cause be-
hind the increased or decreased EPS growth. The table shows the year-over-year differences,
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illustrating that 62 % of the observations, which is the diagonal sum, resulted in increased (de-
creased) EPS growth because the EPS increased (decreased). Thus, for these observations, the
EPS growth metric signals what it attempts to signal.
However, 30 % of the observations increased their EPS from one year to another but still ex-
perienced a decreasing growth because the trailing three-year EPS average ten years ago was
higher than the three-year EPS average 11 years ago.
Similarly, 8 % of the observations could boast about increasing their EPS growth despite having
a decreased year-over-year EPS to report. This figure is particularly raising concerns. For these
observations, increased growth occurred because the trailing three-year EPS average ten years
ago was lower than the three-year EPS average eleven years ago.
Although I apply the EPS growth to identify the 2006 cohort, I consider it a potentially mis-
leading indicator of earnings growth when analyzing the year-by-year performance. This is
particularly the case when a considerable amount of portfolio investments consist of cyclical
and sensitive companies as the EPS growth numbers are especially prone to fluctuate for these
companies and may show an increased (decreased) EPS growth although the EPS decreased
(increased).
5.2.4 Dividend Record
With the modification presented in the methodology chapter, a company must pay dividends
uninterruptedly for the last ten years to fulfill the dividend criterion. Table 5.6 gives an overview
of the Graham companies that continued to meet the criterion and those who violated it after
2006 up until 2020.
By 2010, only 5 companies violated the criterion, with the worst performer paying dividends
for 8 consecutive years, resulting in a weighted mean of 9.77. In 2015, 23 companies were left
that fulfilled the dividend criterion, and 7 companies violated it. For 2019 and 2020, however,
the average improved again. Surprisingly, most companies in the 2006 cohort continued to pay
uninterrupted dividends, even during the Great Recession when few companies respected all of
the SEEDS criteria.
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Table 5.6: Dividend record.
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 n Mean Min
2005 36 36 10.00 10
2006 36 0 36 10.00 10
2007 35 0 0 35 10.00 10
2008 32 0 0 0 32 10.00 10
2009 29 3 0 0 0 32 9.91 9
2010 26 3 2 0 0 0 31 9.77 8
2011 26 1 2 2 0 0 0 31 9.65 7
2012 26 1 0 3 0 1 0 0 31 9.52 5
2013 25 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 31 9.42 6
2014 23 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 30 9.30 5
2015 23 2 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 30 9.23 4
2016 23 1 1 1 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 30 9.17 3
2017 23 1 0 2 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 30 9.10 2
2018 23 1 0 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 30 9.07 2
2019 22 2 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 29 9.31 5
2020 23 2 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 29 9.41 4
5.2.5 Sufficiently Strong Financial Condition
Graham specifies two metrics to evaluate whether a company has a sufficiently strong financial
condition. First, a current ratio of at least two is required. Second, long-term debt must be less
than net current assets (Graham & Zweig, 2006).
Figure 5.5: Current ratio.
Figure 5.5 presents the current ratio of the companies still respecting all criteria, companies that
violated any criteria, and all companies, respectively. The horizontal line represents a current
ratio of two, which is the minimum requirement. It is interesting to observe that most compa-
nies had a current ratio above two throughout the investment period. Additionally, the variation
of current ratios is higher for companies that previously violated any of the SEEDS criteria, and
the median current ratio generally remains higher for the companies that still respect all SEEDS
criteria. Also, there are many outliers for the current ratio—which are cropped out of the plot
for greater clarity of the remaining points—and several of these outliers range up to a current
ratio of 11. Additionally, Wilson Bowden Ltd. had a current ratio of 30.4 and 35.4 in 2018 and
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2019, respectively, which later fell to 11.1 in 2020. A potential reason for 10+ current ratios
could be because a company took up a substantial long-term loan and did not invest the cash
by the end of the accounting period.
Figure 5.6: Long-term debt ratio.
The high values in the later years in figure 5.6 contribute to strengthen this hypothesis. The
figure studies long-term debt relative to the net current assets. For a more straightforward in-
terpretation, I converted the long-term debt less the net current assets criterion into a ratio.
Specifically, the criterion is respected if the ratio lies between 0 and 1. If the ratio is negative,
the net current assets are negative. If above 1, the company has more long-term debt than net
current assets. Moreover, when comparing the companies that still respected the SEEDS crite-
ria versus those that no longer did, an interesting observation emerges—the former generally
decreased their long-term debt relatively to their net current assets, whereas the latter generally
increased it.
While there are multiple reasons why a company may choose to raise more long-term debt, the
developed world’s low interest rates have generally faced since the Great Recession is likely a
contributing factor. If so, then it is essential to consider the economic environment that Graham
experienced when he wrote The Intelligent Investor, in which interest rates were substantially
higher than during the investment period. Assuming the ability to repay the loan with interest
is of key concern when studying the financial condition criterion, it could be relevant to modify
the criterion to depend on the size of the loan and the current and future expected interest rates.
Otherwise, many companies may be disqualified as a company respecting the SEEDS criteria,
although they still have a strong financial condition with the current interest rates.
5.2.6 The Price Criterion
While Graham and Zweig (2006) recommend a price-to-book value of smaller than 22.5, this
criterion was excluded from the SEEDS criteria because the “performance” of the price depends
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to a large extent on factors outside of the company’s control. As demonstrated by the left plot
in figure 5.7, barely any (6) companies would remain in the 2006 cohort if the price criterion
was enforced. While I study the portfolio of companies respecting the price criterion of 22.5
in more detail in the results chapter, this observation is an indicative reason to ignore the price
criterion from the cohort filtering because few companies would remain. When only a few
companies remain, it is hard to construct a well-diversified portfolio and extract any results that
may validate in later cohorts.
Figure 5.7: Graham’s price criterion. The most extreme observations are
cropped out to more easily illustrate the majority of the observations.
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the price criterion score generally falls for the companies
that still respect the SEEDS criteria, whereas the companies that violate the SEEDS criteria
face substantially more variation. Additionally, most of the pricing scores are multiples higher
for most companies in the cohort than Graham’s upper limit of 22.5. Considering that lower
interest rates—which have present during the investment period compared to historical rates—
generally lead to more investments in the stock market, which contributes to driving the prices
higher up (Tessaromatis, 2003), this figure may indicate that the 22.5 criterion is outdated and
should either be replaced by a higher limit or removed altogether.
Finally, three factors affect the pricing score—price, EPS, and tangible book value. The fact
that the pricing score generally increases over time may indicate that the 2006 cohort delivers
high nominal returns to the investor. By the same line of reasoning, the high pricing scores for
companies that previously violated the SEEDS criteria may signify that it is wise to continue
holding the investments despite violating the SEEDS criteria. The company returns are explored
superficially in the next section and thoroughly in the next chapter.
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5.3 Return Performance
Before exploring how the 2006 cohort performs in an investment strategy and relatively to a
benchmark, it is valuable first to understand the companies’ and benchmarks’ nominal returns.
Table 5.7: Summary statistics of the 2006 cohort’s annual returns. All
numbers in percent.
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max Mean
-92.8 -7.9 8.6 32.4 279.6 12.2
Table 5.8: Summary statistics of the 2006 cohort’s HPR. All numbers in
percent.
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max Mean
-97.0 21.5 191.5 534.1 1522.5 313.3
As Table 5.7 shows, the annual returns of the 2006 cohort vary substantially and are skewed in
the positive direction. The mean and median annual return is 12.2 % and 8.6 %, respectively,
which are promising numbers. However, they must be considered relatively to the risk they
pose, which is studied in the next chapter.
When studying the holding period returns in table 5.8, the returns still look promising. The
average company delivered 313.3 % of the return on investment, while the median return is
substantially lower at 191.5 %. The large difference is primarily caused by the fact that a few
companies vastly outperform the rest in terms of nominal returns not adjusted for risk. For
instance, the best-performing company overall, Novo Nordisk, delivered over 15 times total
return on the investment, and the best single-year performance was a return of 291.3 % in 2009
when the British housebuilding company Taylor Wimpey PLC regained some of its large losses
that it experienecd during the Great Recession. However, it is promosing that the third quartile
delivered as much as 534.1 % HPR over a 15-year period, meaning that a decent amount of
companies delivered high holding period returns.
On the other side of the spectrum, five companies delivered negative holding period returns. For
example, the worst single-year performer, Sears, delivered a –92.8 % return in a single year,
whereas the worst total performer Esprit Holdings Ltd., eventually ended up with a holding
period return of –97.0 %. The remaining three companies delivering a negative HPR were
Centex LLC, Kate Spade & Co LLC, and Kellwood Co LLC, with an HPR of –83.0 %, –46.3 %,
and –7.1 %, respectively.
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Table 5.9: Benchmark returns and average risk-free rate for the corre-
sponding country. All numbers in percent.
Annual returns
Ticker Country Min 1Q Median 3Q Max Mean HPR CAGR r f
CAC France –42.68 –2.64 6.69 16.95 26.37 3.49 17.73 1.09 2.02
FBMKLCI Malaysia –39.33 –5.22 5.11 17.14 45.17 6.10 80.84 4.03 3.80
HSI Hong Kong –48.27 –5.27 4.09 31.38 52.02 8.17 83.05 4.11 2.17
OMX Sweden –38.75 –4.61 7.37 20.37 43.69 6.48 95.28 4.56 1.43
OMXCCAPGI Denmark –49.32 4.41 20.51 29.79 38.55 13.09 379.42 11.01 0.91
OSEBX Norway –54.06 5.20 13.71 18.91 64.78 11.16 192.92 7.43 2.29
SPTSX Canada –35.03 –7.30 7.29 14.50 30.69 4.40 54.66 2.95 2.35
SPX USA –38.49 0.88 12.09 17.97 29.60 8.58 200.90 7.62 2.64
TPX Japan –41.77 –9.63 3.76 13.89 51.46 2.60 9.39 0.60 0.67
UKX UK –31.33 –4.38 6.74 11.76 22.07 3.07 14.98 0.93 2.33
MXWO Global –42.08 –1.33 8.32 19.57 26.98 6.39 113.87 5.20 2.64
Relatively to the results presented in Table 5.7 and 5.8, the benchmark results presented in
Table 5.9 is a considerable contrast. With the Danish and Norwegian benchmarks being two
exceptions, the mean annual returns trail substantially below the 2006 cohort’s mean annual
return. Additionally, all benchmarks deliver a substantially lower HPR than the 3rd quartile of
the 2006 cohort, and only the Danish benchmark deliver an HPR higher than the cohort’s mean
HPR. The differences between the cohort and the benchmark performances increases further
when one notes that the Danish, Norwegian, and US benchmarks deliver substantially higher
HPR than the other benchmarks.
Moreover, these results also apply when studying the global benchmark, MSCI World (MXWO),
which delivers a mean annual return rate of 6.39% and an HPR of 113.87% (CAGR of 5.20%).
However, it is important to notice that the global benchmark is underperforming substantially
against—amongst others—the US benchmark. Since the 2006 cohort has a majority of US
companies, the results from Table 5.9 imply that the local reference index may likely deliver
higher returns than the global reference index. If so, this observation will, in turn, have the con-
sequence that the excess return of the portfolios I am studying in this thesis will be relatively
lower when compared against a local benchmark and relatively higher when comparing against
a global benchmark. This observation demonstrates the importance of choosing a proper bench-




This thesis aims to study how the 2006 cohort of companies meeting the SEEDS criteria perform
relatively to the market during the investment period 2006–2020. While evaluating just one
cohort is a weakness to validate the results because there are no new data (cohorts) to test the
findings on, the results found in this chapter will primarily be used to form a main hypothesis
that will be tested on new cohorts as future research after this thesis.
Therefore, this chapter focuses on analyzing various pricing, holding, and rebalancing strate-
gies. Additionally, each strategy will be tested against both a local and a global benchmark,
and the final suggested strategy will also be tested against multiple base currencies instead of
using only the local currencies. Hence, all evaluated strategies before the currency section will
be listed in local currency (LCY). For brevity, the LCY code will not be appended to the strategy
code. For instance, the strategy P1–H1–R1–LCY will be listed as P1–H1–R1.
Moreover, while discovering a specific strategy that hopefully delivers promising results is
important to form a specific hypothesis to test on new cohorts, it is not the main aspiration
of this chapter. Instead, I hope that the results are generally consistent across many strategy
alternatives because such a finding may indicate that I am able to avoid overfitting. Hence, the
discussion throughout the chapter will center on these two key considerations.
6.1 Pricing Strategies
While having overlapping investment philosophies, Benjamin Graham and Charlie Munger
differ substantially in which of the investment candidates to actually invest in. Specifically,
Benjamin Graham was occupied with buying stocks well below their intrinsic value, leading
him to recommend the defensive investor to buy stocks meeting the SEEDS criteria and having a
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price criterion score PE ·
P
tBV  22.5. Warren Buffett followed Graham’s principle, too, and often
sold his investments only a couple of years after the acquisition because the investment had
reached its intrinsic value (Greenwald et al., 2020a). It was only after he met Charlie Munger,
however, that Buffett became less occupied with price and more occupied with holding high-
quality stocks, and preferably to hold them indefinitely (Munger, 1994).
Munger appreciates buying at a discount, but he is more occupied with buying quality company
shares that have the potential to deliver high returns and that he can hold for many years. His
reasoning was a contributing factor as to why Graham’s pricing criterion was excluded as a
required criterion in this thesis, forming the SEEDS criteria. Hence, it is natural that the results
chapter starts by exploring how well Graham and Munger’s suggestions regarding price hold
up when applied to the 2006 cohort. These will be studied next.
6.1.1 Pricing Strategy 1: Graham’s Selection
Figure 6.1: Pricing strategy 1’s pricing score rank against DCAGR.
The first strategy involves testing whether the companies meeting Graham’s price criterion ex-
ceed the market’s returns, assuming the hold–index (H1) and no rebalancing (R1) strategies.
Since the P1 strategy involves a limited pricing score range, only six companies enter the in-
vestment portfolio—illustrated between the vertical thresholds in figure 6.1—and only four
of these companies are still tradeable at the end of 2020. Specifically, Orkla, Leggett and Platt
Inc., MDC Holdings Inc., and PPB Group Bhd. are tradeable throughout the investment period,
while Kellwood Co. LLC and Sears Canada Inc. stop trading during the investment period.
Moreover, four of the six companies are cyclical, whereas the remaining two are defensive
investments. Country-specific, three companies are listed in the US, which creates a 50 %
portfolio exposure to the USA.
Table 6.1 provides a further overview of this strategy’s performance.
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Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 62.45
Asset weight, min 0.40
Best annual return 49.2





Table 6.2: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P1–H1–
R1.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 220.0 206.1
HPR, benchmark 155.2 113.9
Holding period excess return 64.8 92.2
CAGR, portfolio 8.06 7.74
CAGR, benchmark 6.44 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.72 2.64
Asset beta 0.79 0.65
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 2.38 3.43





When comparing against the local and global benchmarks, strategy P1–H1–R1 delivers a posi-
tive alpha of 2.38 % and 3.43 %, respectively, each with a beta well below 1. Since the CAPM
model assumes a well-diversified portfolio and the portfolio in strategy P1 only consists of 4–6
companies at any given time, these numbers provide little insight. Additionally, the highest and
lowest asset exposure during the investment period was 62.45 % and 0.40 %, demonstrating
that the portfolio is not well-diversified over time.
It may, therefore, be more relevant to study the information ratio. An information ratio of 0.17
and 0.22 for the local and global benchmark indicates that while the portfolio delivers risk-
adjusted excess returns, the strategy does not perform consistently well. Both the local and
the global metric partially confirm this, and the AOR further shows that the strategy provides
a higher annual return than the benchmark in only 8 of the 15 years (53.3 %). However, the
strategy’s holding period return (HPR) is higher than the benchmark’s HPR by as much as
97.1 % and 96.5 % of the days in the investment period when comparing against the local and
global benchmark. The final holding period excess return (HPER) is 64.8 % and 92.2 %—a
DCAGR of 1.62 % and 2.54 %—against the benchmarks, respectively. These results indicate
that although the strategy does not outperform the market more than about half of the years in
the investment period, it usually outperforms the benchmarks cumulatively. This is confirmed
by figure 6.2, which shows that the strategy outperformed the benchmarks substantially during
the Great Recession, resulting ultimately in a high COR. However, it is interesting to observe
that while HPER increased substantially during and shortly after the Great Recession, it fell
drastically during COVID-19’s stock market crash in the spring of 2020.
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Figure 6.2: Strategy P1–H1–R1’s cumulative excess returns. Time periods
highlighted in gray are the global benchmark’s bear periods.
6.1.2 Pricing Strategy 2: All Companies
Figure 6.3: Pricing strategy 2’s pricing score rank against DCAGR.
The second strategy involves investing in all 36 companies that meet the SEEDS criteria on
December 31st 2005, assuming the hold–index (H1) and no rebalancing (R1) strategies. Of
these, 21 companies are cyclical, six are defensive, nine are sensitive, and 29 are still tradeable
at the end of 2020.
Table 6.1 provides a further overview of this strategy’s performance.
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Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 17.51
Asset weight, min 0.01
Best annual return 37.4





Table 6.4: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P2–H1–
R1.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 327.2 326.7
HPR, benchmark 146.3 113.9
Holding period excess return 180.9 212.8
CAGR, portfolio 10.17 10.16
CAGR, benchmark 6.19 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.33 2.64
Asset beta 0.98 0.87
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 4.04 5.29





Strategy P2–H1–R1 shows promising risk-adjusted results, with an alpha of 4.04 % and 5.29
% against the local and global benchmark. This achievement is partially caused by high re-
turns delivered by the investment pool, and partially because strategy P2–H1–R1 has a lower
volatility than the benchmarks, with a beta of 0.98 and 0.87 against the local and global bench-
mark. In addition, also an information ratio of 0.79 and 0.81 against the two benchmarks show
promising results.
Moreover, the strategy’s portfolio delivered an annualized return, CAGR, of over 10 % annu-
ally, which outperformed the benchmarks with a DCAGR by 3.98 % and 4.96 %. Thus, com-
pared to strategy P1–H1–R1, the AOR has improved and outperforms the benchmarks in 12
and 11 years. However, the COR fell in P2–H1–R1 because it underperformed the benchmarks
for a longer time during the Great Recession than strategy P1–H1–R1 (see figure 6.4).
While strategy P2–H1–R1 demonstrates promising results, the importance of these results ex-
tends beyond the strategy. Specifically, when backtesting, it is imperative to avoid overfitting
strategies. Strategy P2–H1–R1 may arguably be the most general strategy evaluated in this
thesis, telling investors to buy all companies in the cohort once and then hold the portfolio.
Additionally, reinvestments are not affecting excess returns much because the amounts are
reinvested into the index and not the portfolio. Therefore, this strategy may avoid overfitting
the most, making the results of this strategy particularly promising for further research into
other cohorts.
56
Figure 6.4: Strategy P2–H1–R1’s cumulative excess returns.
6.1.3 Pricing Strategy 3: All Excluding Tails
Figure 6.5: Pricing strategy 3’s pricing score rank against DCAGR.
Whereas strategy P2–H1–R1 shows promising results, the range of the pricing criterion scores
is concerning. Specifically, table 6.3 showed that the score ranged from less than four to almost
130,000. This extensive range may be caused by some underlying structural problems with the
outlier companies not captured by the SEEDS criteria. Hence, a relevant strategy to test next is
to invest in all companies with a reasonable pricing criterion score.
By specifying that the price criterion score PEPS ·
P
tBV must be larger than or equal to 10 and
less than or equal to 200, 26 companies are selected at the start of the investment period, of
which 21 are still tradeable at the end of 2020. These 26 companies have a price criterion score
ranging from 15.10 to 108.65, which places them all well inside the thresholds.
Among these 26 companies, 14 are cyclical, three defensive, and nine sensitive. Hence, seven,
three, and zero of the cyclical, defensive, and sensitive companies were removed, respectively,
limiting the allowable pricing score range.
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Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 22.19
Asset weight, min 0.33
Best annual return 38.5





Table 6.6: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P3–H1–
R1.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 380.8 375.9
HPR, benchmark 168.6 113.9
Holding period excess return 212.2 262.0
CAGR, portfolio 11.04 10.96
CAGR, benchmark 6.81 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.25 2.64
Asset beta 0.99 0.90
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 4.27 6.02





While the performance results are better than in some metrics and are worse than strategy P2–
H1–R1 in others, the results are still promising. With volatility still lower than the benchmarks,
the strategy delivers an alpha of 4.27 % and 6.02 % against the local and global benchmarks,
respectively. This is an improvement against P2–H1–R1, and the same applies to DCAGR,
which increased to 4.23 % and 5.76 %. The information ratio remains high at 0.76 and 0.84.
Also, both the COR and AOR metrics are consistent with the P2–H1–R1 strategy findings.
What is particularly interesting is studying the HPER visually in figure 6.6. While achieving
nominal returns of approximately 250 % over 15 years for a portfolio that is slightly less volatile
than a broad stock market benchmark is impressive in itself, it is necessary to keep in mind that
figure 6.6 does not show nominal returns. Instead, it illustrates excess nominal returns against
a benchmark that has also delivered good results in the investment period. For instance, the
HPER against the global benchmark was 262.0 %, whereas the HPR of the global benchmark
was 113.9 %. This means that the excess holding period return of strategy P3–H1–R1 is more
than two times higher than all of the return the global benchmark delivered in the same in-
vestment period, and the HPER consistently increased during the investment period. These are
promising results that will make the following sections especially interesting to explore further.
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Figure 6.6: Strategy P3–H1–R1’s cumulative excess returns.
6.1.4 Pricing Strategy 4: Maximize Returns
Figure 6.7: Pricing strategy 4’s pricing score rank against DCAGR.
While strategies P2–H1–R1 and P3–H1–R1 delivered good results with a wide price criterion
interval, a natural question is which price criterion interval delivers the highest returns. I try
answering this question by exploring the pricing strategy P4. However, this strategy should not
be selected as the pricing strategy to move forward with as it uses the performance data both
as inputs and as outputs. Nevertheless, the results from this strategy may form new hypotheses
that could be tested in later cohorts. Additionally, pricing strategy P4 may provide insights into
how close pricing strategy P3’s price criterion interval is to the return-maximizing interval
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Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 24.87
Asset weight, min 0.02
Best annual return 38.8





Table 6.8: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P4–H1–
R1.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 450.0 445.7
HPR, benchmark 179.5 113.9
Holding period excess return 270.5 331.8
CAGR, portfolio 12.04 11.98
CAGR, benchmark 7.09 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.27 2.64
Asset beta 0.96 0.87
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 5.12 7.11





For pricing strategy P4, a minimum of 20 companies was required. The same number of com-
panies was selected by strategy P4–H1–R1 and resulted in the price criterion interval of 41.71 to
257.11. Of these 20 companies, 18 still traded at the end of 2020. Interestingly, pricing strategy
P2 and P3 had substantially higher exposure to cyclical companies, whereas pricing strategy
P4 has equally many cyclical as sensitive companies in its portfolio. However, because the
strategy involves no rebalancing, the portfolio exposure to single stocks deviates substantially
from the target weights of 5 % each during the investment period. For instance, the highest
asset weight of any single investment at any point in time during the investment period is 24.87
%.
Although the risk exposure to specific investments is considerable, the beta remains below both
benchmarks. The alpha is 5.12 % and 7.11 % against the local and global benchmarks, which
is 85 and 109 basis points higher than the alphas achieved in strategy P3–H1–R1. In addition,
the portfolio’s CAGR is 12.04 % and 11.98 % when reinvesting into the local versus the global
benchmark, which is a 100 and 102 basis point improvement against strategy P3–H1–R1.
Hence, when comparing against strategy P3–H1–R1, there are still considerable risk-adjusted
and risk-unadjusted nominal returns that could have been achieved by improving the pricing
score interval even further. However, it is crucial to be aware that although the results could
have been improved for this particular cohort, this is a helpful example of how overfitting may
occur when backtesting investment strategies.
Therefore, a future analysis could first involve forming a hypothesis that a cohort delivers out-
performing results for companies with a pricing score in the range of, for example, 40 to 250,
and then test this hypothesis on new data on a different cohort than the one of 2006. Consider-
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ing the sample period considerations that were made and described in the data considerations
chapter, the new cohort should preferably be one after 2006 but also a cohort that is not too
present. Additionally, if a cohort is chosen shortly after 2006, most of the 2006 cohort would
also qualify for the new analyzed cohort. It could therefore be a potential idea to exclude these
companies from the hypothesis testing since I would otherwise have formed the hypothesis
based on data I have already seen—a process typically called “data snooping”.
Figure 6.8: Strategy P4–H1–R1’s cumulative excess returns. With a local
COR of 98.5 %, strategy P4–H1–R1 underperforms the local benchmark
for less than 3 months during the entire 15-year investment period.
6.1.5 The Chosen Pricing Strategy
Graham’s investment philosophy on price, represented by pricing strategy P1, outperformed
both the local and global market when applied to strategy P1–H1–R1. However, the portfolio
of only six companies, four of which were still tradeable at the end of the investment period,
performed worse than the strategies that resemble Munger’s investment philosophy on price.
While strategy P4–H1–R1 outperformed the market the most, pricing strategy P4 should not
be selected as it snooped in the data set when selecting the price interval range. Additionally,
although a more active investor could choose pricing strategy P2, a defensive investor may
be wiser in selecting strategy P3 because it may weed out companies with more substantial
structural problems not identified by the SEEDS criteria. Since this thesis focuses on Benjamin
Graham’s stock selection criteria for the defensive investor, I propose to choose pricing strategy
P3 and analyze further with various holding and rebalancing strategies.
6.2 Holding Strategies
Munger and Graham have seemingly different perspectives on stocks’ holding period. On one
side, Munger’s philosophy involves holding the few selected quality stocks forever. When ap-
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plied to this thesis, this investment philosophy involves that if a company violates a SEEDS
criteria, it should still be kept in the portfolio. On the other hand, while Graham and Zweig
(2006) propose no clear directions on whether an intelligent investor should sell a stock that
violated any of the SEEDS criteria, as the father of value investing, Graham was prone to buy
a stock under its intrinsic value and sell it above its intrinsic value. His attitude was described
more precisely in Phalon (2002, p. 21), “Ben himself rarely tried to push profits, cautiously
selling ... when he saw a 50 % profit.” Considering both that Graham frequently sold even
a high-quality company as long as it traded on a favorable price and that Graham and Zweig
(2006) stress the importance of undertaking due diligence of the quality of the company, es-
pecially if you are an “enterprising investor”, is it reasonable to assume that Graham would
consider selling an investment once it violates a SEEDS criterion. Therefore, I explore both
holding strategies in this section.
Additionally, to ensure that potential good (bad) portfolio performances are not caused merely
by reinvestment into the remaining well (poorly) performing investments, I consider both rein-
vestments into the portfolio and the appropriate index. Hence, I evaluate four holding strategies
as a next step while applying the chosen pricing strategy P3 from the previous section and still
assuming no rebalancing (R1).
6.2.1 Holding Strategy 1: Hold–Index
Figure 6.9: Strategy P3–H1–R1’s individual asset HPR including reinvest-
ments.
Strategy P3–H1–R1 was analyzed in section 6.1.3 on page 57 and will not be covered in detail
again. However, it is worth noting that since the strategy involves no rebalancing, the weights
of the various investments change considerably over time, as shown in figure 6.9.
62
6.2.2 Holding Strategy 2: Hold–Portfolio
Figure 6.10: Strategy P3–H2–R1’s individual asset HPR including rein-
vestments.
While strategy P3–H1–R1 reinvests into the index when a company stops trading, holding
strategy H2 reinvests these amounts into the remaining portfolio assets. Since the amounts are
invested in such a way that the weights of the investments do not change, the only considerable
difference between figure 6.9 and figure 6.10 is that higher amounts are invested into each
remaining investment.








Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 22.19
Asset weight, min 0.33
Best annual return 39.5





Table 6.10: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P3–H2–
R1.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 406.7 406.7
HPR, benchmark 168.6 113.9
Holding period excess return 238.1 292.8
CAGR, portfolio 11.43 11.43
CAGR, benchmark 6.81 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.25 2.64
Asset beta 0.99 0.89
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 4.65 6.51





However, considerable differences arise performance-wise. Precisely, since the investment pool
is chosen with pricing strategy P3, which delivers higher returns than the benchmarks, strategy
P3–H2–R1 delivers a 25.9 % and 30.8 % points higher portfolio HPR than strategy P3–H1–R1
(studying with reinvestments into the local versus the global benchmark, respectively). How-
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ever, the beta is nearly identical, so alpha has also increased—by 38 and 49 basis points against
the local and global benchmark.
Some metrics are mainly unaffected by the chosen reinvestment method. For instance, the
information ratio is largely unaffected, and the same applies to the COR and AOR. However,
there are no noteworthy differences between the two strategies except that strategy P3–H2–R1
delivers higher returns, and it can be concluded that when certain investments stop trading,
P3–H2–R1 strategy is a better alternative than reinvesting the amounts into the index. It is also
more reasonable for a portfolio manager to reinvest any amounts into the remaining portfolio
than reinvest them into the index from a practical perspective. Hence, holding strategy H2
should be favored over H1 regardless of the pricing and holding strategy.
Figure 6.11: Strategy P3–H2–R1’s cumulative excess returns.
6.2.3 Holding Strategy 3: Sell–Index
Figure 6.12: Strategy P3–H3–R1’s individual asset HPR including rein-
vestments.
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The third holding strategy involves selling a portfolio investment the first day it violates any
SEEDS criteria, refusing any re-entry for the rest of the investment period, and then reinvesting
the proceeds into the index. For example, figure 6.12 shows how the HPR develops for all 26
companies until no more investments were left in the portfolio in 2020. The steep HPR decline
at the end of each investment period indicates that the investment is being sold in total and ends
with a final holding period return of –100 % because of the sale.








Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 100
Asset weight, min 1.36
Best annual return 32.5





Table 6.12: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P3–H3–
R1.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 218.8 166.4
HPR, benchmark 168.6 113.9
Holding period excess return 50.2 52.5
CAGR, portfolio 8.04 6.75
CAGR, benchmark 6.81 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.25 2.64
Asset beta 0.98 0.95
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 1.34 1.68





Although the strategy delivers outperforming results, they are not as promising as the results
from the previously studied strategies (except for strategy P1–H1–R1). As table 6.12 shows, the
portfolio is still less volatile than the market, but alpha is substantially lower than past strategies
with only 134 and 168 basis points outperformance against the local and global benchmark.
However, since the CAPM model assumes a well-diversified portfolio, and there are only two
companies left in the portfolio during the second half of the investment period, both the beta
and the alpha may be misleading. Instead, studying the information ratio shows a decently
good score but not nearly as good as previous strategies.
While a strategy that sells all investments during the investment period may not be that inter-
esting to study for a single cohort, holding strategy H3, which invests frequently, may make
more sense for a portfolio manager to consider. Specifically, a portfolio manager may invest
both in 2006, and in cohorts of the following years. Eliminating investments that violate any
SEEDS criteria will reduce investments from each cohort, but new investments are likely added
to the portfolio pool every year. Thus, the holding strategies that involve selling when a crite-
rion is violated may provide insights into how well the remaining companies performed. Also,
it may indicate how well a portfolio that invests into new cohorts every year could potentially
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have performed. However, as specified in the previous section, it may be more relevant for a
portfolio manager to reinvest the funds into the remaining portfolio, not an index—studied in
the following section.
6.2.4 Holding Strategy 4: Sell–Portfolio
Figure 6.13: Strategy P3–H4–R1’s individual asset HPR including rein-
vestments.
In comparison to holding strategy P3–H3–R1, amounts are reinvested into the portfolio. Thus,
although the two strategies have the same weight exposure in each asset, the difference between
the two is that the invested amounts in each company are substantially higher in holding strategy
H4. This can be seen from the y-axis in figure 6.13 and compared against figure 6.12.








Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 100
Asset weight, min 1.36
Best annual return 46.9





Table 6.14: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P3–H4–
R1.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 442.2 453.7
HPR, benchmark 168.6 113.9
Holding period excess return 273.6 339.8
CAGR, portfolio 11.93 12.09
CAGR, benchmark 6.81 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.25 2.64
Asset beta 0.93 0.85
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 5.43 7.26





Moreover, table 6.13 indicates substantially higher portfolio HPR than strategy P3–H3–R1
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achieved (table 6.13). Hence, it outperformed the previous strategy by 223,4 and 287,3 against
the local and benchmark, respectively. Moreover, with a higher portfolio HPR, identical bench-
mark returns, and lower betas, the alpha also improves substantially—from 134 and 168 ba-
sis points in strategy P3–H3–R1 to 543 and 726 basis points in strategy P3–H4–R1. Hence,
strategy P3–H4–R1 performs substantially better than P3–H3–R1. However, since the CAPM
model assumes a well-diversified portfolio, which is not the case for strategy P3–H4–R1 af-
ter the Great Recession, these metrics cannot be given too much weight. Nevertheless, the
portfolio delivers substantially better returns than strategy P3–H3–R1.
Additionally, this strategy is prone to overfitting because the returns depend on how well the
last few companies perform. Since NIKE Inc.—one of the best performers in the cohort—was
the only remaining investment in the portfolio for the last four years of the investment horizon,
it is natural that the portfolio also performs well for this cohort. Whereas past performance is
no guarantee of future returns, this is likely even more true for strategy P3–H4–R1 if applied
to other cohorts than if following any of the other holding strategies.
6.2.5 The Chosen Pricing–Holding Strategy
Given pricing strategy P3 and rebalancing strategy R1, Graham’s perspective of selling an
investment when it violates any SEEDS criteria outperforms the market when reinvesting the
proceeds into an index and portfolio. For the sell–index holding strategy (H4), the outper-
formance was the greatest of all holding strategies across multiple key metrics. However, its
performance is sensitive to the few remaining portfolio investments, primarily since no more
cohorts are considered in this analysis. Additionally, the alpha should not be given too much
weight for strategy H4 because few companies remain in the portfolio after the financial crisis.
Munger’s holding philosophy (H1 and H2) is favored when emphasizing the information ratio
as it delivers a substantially higher number. Additionally, since the other performance metrics
are favorable for strategy P3–H1–R1 and P3–H2–R1 and it is reasonable for a portfolio man-
ager to reinvest any proceeds back into the portfolio, the recommendation of this section is to
proceed with the hold–portfolio holding strategy (H2).
As a result, the following section will assume pricing strategy P3 and holding strategy H2 when
evaluating various rebalancing strategies.
6.3 Rebalancing Strategies
The previous sections explored seven strategies that all assumed no rebalancing. However, as
seen from the tables presented with each strategy, the maximum asset exposure can grow large.
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For instance, for strategy P3–H2–R1, the most considerable asset weight at any given time
was 22.19 % in a portfolio holding between 21 and 26 investments. This high asset exposure
calls for analysis on rebalancing efforts. On this topic, Zweig (Graham and Zweig, 2006, pp.
104–105) writes in a commentary chapter, “The key is to rebalance on a predictable, patient
schedule—not so often that you will drive yourself crazy, and not so seldom that your targets
will get out of whack”.
Achieving an easy-to-manage rebalancing strategy is the focus of this section. To make rebal-
ancing simple, all assets invested are rebalanced back to the same asset weight.
6.3.1 Rebalancing Strategy 1: No Rebalancing
Figure 6.14: Strategy P3–H2–R1’s individual asset exposure in portfolio.
Strategy P3–H12-R1 was analyzed in section 6.2.2 on page 63 and are not covered in detail
again. However, to illustrate the effect that the following rebalancing strategies will have on
the variation in portfolio weights, figure 6.14 is provided as a comparison. As can be seen from
the figure, particularly the years at the end of the Great Recession caused a few companies to
appreciate so much in value that they made up a substantial portion of the entire portfolio. For
instance, at the end of 2020, Novo Nordisk and NIKE Inc. combined 27.9 % of the portfolio.
This increased risk exposure to certain investments can also be observed by the red line, repre-
senting the median investment’s weight on any given date. The line is slightly decreasing over
time, although the reduced number of tradeable companies from 26 to 21 companies should
have increased the median weight, all else held equal. The fact that the median investment de-
creased, from 3.85 % at the start of the investment period to 3.08 % at the end of the investment
period, indicates how the risk exposure has changed over time.
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6.3.2 Rebalancing Strategy 2: Annual Rebalancing
Figure 6.15: Strategy P3–H2–R2’s individual asset exposure in portfolio.
So far in this thesis, all strategies have involved a no rebalancing strategy. A considerable
downside with all the previous strategies has been that the exposure to specific investments
such as Novo Nordisk and NIKE Inc. grew large while other investments such as Sears and
Kate Spade & Co decreased to almost zero. Since the literature frequently mentions annual
rebalancing as an often-used method, this rebalancing strategy is tested out next on the 26
investments selected from the P3 pricing strategy.








Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 10.29
Asset weight, min 0.68
Best annual return 43.8





Table 6.16: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P3–H2–
R2.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 468.9 468.9
HPR, benchmark 158.3 113.9
Holding period excess return 310.6 355.0
CAGR, portfolio 12.29 12.29
CAGR, benchmark 6.53 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.25 2.64
Asset beta 1.12 1.00
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 5.26 7.10





Compared to strategy P3–H2–R1, the upside exposure to single assets decreases substantially.
Specifically, P3–H2–R1 had a maximal asset exposure of 22.19 %—illustrated by the upper
horizontal line in figure 6.14—with Novo Nordisk on January 6th 2016. In comparison, the
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maximal exposure in strategy P3–H2–R2 was only 10.29 %, which PulteGroup Inc. achieved
on October 21st 2012.
Despite annual rebalancing reducing the exposure of great performers such as Novo Nordisk
and NIKE Inc., portfolio P3–H2–R2 delivers the best returns of all portfolios analyzed so far,
delivering a rebalancing bonus of 86 basis points. In addition, the beta surprisingly increases
substantially, in which the beta is above one as the first strategy analyzed so far.
Nevertheless, since the nominal return increased substantially against strategy P3–H2–R1, from
a CAGR of 11.43 % per year to 12.29 per year in the annual rebalancing strategy, alpha also
increased. Specifically, when comparing against a local benchmark, alpha was 61 basis points
higher with annual rebalancing than no rebalancing when comparing against a local benchmark,
and 59 basis points higher when comparing against a global benchmark. It is also interesting to
note that annual rebalancing had only a marginal effect on COR, meaning that rebalancing did
not have much effect to help the portfolio eliminate its underperformance against the bench-
mark during the Great Recession. This point can be seen by comparing figure 6.16 with figure
6.11.
Figure 6.16: Strategy P3–H2–R2’s cumulative excess returns.
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6.3.3 Rebalancing Strategy 3: Monthly Rebalancing
Figure 6.17: Strategy P3–H2–R3’s individual asset exposure in portfolio.
Another commonly mentioned rebalancing method in the literature is the monthly method.
This method may be favored compared to an annual rebalancing strategy by investors who
are mainly concerned with not deviating too much from the target weights. For example, the
highest asset exposure in strategy P3–H2–R2 was approximately 2.7 times higher than the
target weight. By rebalancing more often, then, the individual asset exposure can decrease
further.








Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 6.91
Asset weight, min 1.13
Best annual return 46.9





Table 6.18: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P3–H2–
R3.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 495.5 495.5
HPR, benchmark 159.0 113.9
Holding period excess return 336.5 381.6
CAGR, portfolio 12.63 12.63
CAGR, benchmark 6.55 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.25 2.64
Asset beta 1.14 1.02
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 5.47 7.39





With a maximum asset exposure of 6.91 %, the largest asset exposure has reduced to approxi-
mately 1.8 times the target weight. Moreover, the HPR improved more than strategy P3–H2–P2
did, delivering close to 500 % return over 15 years with a marginally higher beta. Hence, the
alpha increased further to 5.47 % and 7.39 % against the local and global benchmark, respec-
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tively, a 21 and 29 basis point improvement against the annual rebalancing. Of all rebalancing
strategies, monthly rebalancing delivers the highest rebalancing bonus with 119 basis points.
Although both the nominal return and the alpha improved, in addition to a better information ra-
tio and AOR, I do not recommend the monthly rebalancing strategy over the annual rebalancing
strategy. The reason is that compared to the annual rebalancing strategy, monthly rebalancing
delivered 26.6 percentage points higher portfolio HPR under the assumption of no transaction
costs. However, assuming 26 transactions every period (ignoring the fact that five companies
stop trading during the investment period) leads to 390 transactions when rebalancing annually,
whereas that number increases to 4680 transactions if rebalancing monthly. Hence, the transac-
tion costs will likely eat up the additional HPR earned when rebalancing monthly compared to
annually. Additionally, such a systematic rebalancing strategy as monthly rebalancing violates
Graham’s advice of being a defensive investor that spends only a few hours a year administer-
ing her portfolio (Graham & Zweig, 2006). Hence, I will advise against choosing a monthly
rebalancing strategy despite the seemingly better returns that are listed in table 6.17.
Figure 6.18: Strategy P3–H2–R3’s cumulative excess returns. Final HPR
is particularly high for the monthly rebalancing strategy when assuming no
transaction costs.
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6.3.4 Rebalancing Strategy 4: Threshold Rebalancing
Figure 6.19: Strategy P3–H2–R4’s individual asset exposure in portfolio.
A third commonly used rebalancing method is rebalancing when the portfolio deviates from the
target weights by a certain amount. For rebalancing strategy R4, I specify that this threshold is
set to when the sum of the absolute deviations surpasses 15 percentage points.








Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 8.77
Asset weight, min 1.25
Best annual return 42.9





Table 6.20: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P3–H2–
R4.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 470.1 470.1
HPR, benchmark 159.5 113.9
Holding period excess return 310.6 356.2
CAGR, portfolio 12.30 12.3
CAGR, benchmark 6.56 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.25 2.64
Asset beta 1.13 1.01
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 5.16 7.09





For strategy P3–H2–R4, a rebalancing occurs three times in 2007, four times in 2008, twice in
2009 and 2010, once each year from 2011 to 2019, and finally twice in 2020. Unsurprisingly,
the thresholds are frequently passed during times of distress, such as the Great Recession and
the COVID-19 stock market crash in 2020. However, compared to annual rebalancing–which
has 15 rebalancings compared to the threshold rebalancing strategy’s 22—most performance
measures are practically equal, with the rebalancing bonus deviating by only 1 basis point, ex-
cept for a decreased asset exposure range in the threshold rebalancing. This is natural since the
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thresholds were calculated on a sum of absolute deviations basis with a low threshold of only
15 %. However, despite the similarities in results between annual and threshold rebalancing, it
is essential to highlight that this result may be primarily a coincidence for this particular cohort
and may deviate more for later cohorts. Moreover, considering that most threshold rebalanc-
ing occurred during the Great Recession, more considerable performance differences between
annual and threshold rebalancing are likely.
6.3.5 Rebalancing Strategy 5: Annual Rebalancing Excluding Low Per-
formers
Figure 6.20: Strategy P3–H2–R5’s individual asset exposure in portfolio.
A downside of rebalancing all portfolio investments when the investing style is defensive,
including no further analysis of each company besides the initial SEEDS and price criterion
screening, is that the portfolio may include some companies that consistently underperform.
This insight calls for a rebalancing strategy that applies annual rebalancing but does not rebal-
ance the lowest 25 % of the underperformers as measured by HPR. The effect of this strategy
can be seen in figure 6.20, in which the underperformers are only rebalanced again if they de-
liver high returns for a more extended period of time so they are not part of the bottom 25 % of
performers.
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Exposure and returns (%)
Asset weight, max 9.43
Asset weight, min 0.42
Best annual return 44.5





Table 6.22: Absolute and relative
performance of strategy P3–H2–
R5.
Risk-unadjusted returns (%) Local Global
HPR, portfolio 471.4 471.4
HPR, benchmark 158.3 113.9
Holding period excess return 313.1 357.5
CAGR, portfolio 12.32 12.32
CAGR, benchmark 6.53 5.20
Risk-adjusted returns
Risk-free rate (%) 2.25 2.64
Asset beta 1.04 0.93
Jensen’s Alpha (%) 5.60 7.30





When comparing against the results presented in table 6.15 on page 69, strategy P3–H2–R5
outperforms strategy P3–H2–R2. Specifically, although HPR is practically the same in the two
strategies, the beta is reduced with the modified rebalancing strategy, which further improves
the alpha to 5.60 % and 7.30 % against the local and global benchmark, respectively. The re-
balancing bonus is the second highest with 89 basis points, although it is substantially lower
than the rebalancing bonus from the monthly rebalancing strategy at 119 basis points. Addi-
tionally, the information ratio increases substantially, from 0.74 and 0.81 to 0.90 and 0.93 when
compared against the local and global benchmark, respectively. Moreover, while the AOR in-
creases with one more year of outperformance against a local benchmark, COR and AOR are
almost identical for the two strategies. According to the results presented in table 6.22 then, a
defensive investor who will not undergo a thorough analysis of the investment portfolio may
therefore prefer a rebalancing strategy R5 in which money will not repeatedly be poured into
the consistent underperformers.
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Figure 6.21: Strategy P3–H2–R5’s cumulative excess returns. The strategy
outperforms the market—and by a substantial amount—in five of six bull
periods, and underperforming slightly in one. For the five bear periods, the
strategy underperforms in two—of which heavily during the COVID-19
stock market crash in 2020—outperforms in two, and performs equally
well in one.
6.4 P3–H2–R5—The Chosen Strategy
This thesis aims to answer whether the 2006 cohort of companies that respect the SEEDS criteria
outperform the market in the investment period from 2006 to 2020. But, more importantly,
the thesis also aims to formulate a hypothesis of an investment strategy that can be tested
against more future cohorts and preferably perform well. Hence, identifying a general but
well-performing strategy has been a more critical focus of this thesis than identifying the single
best-performing strategy.
Such a general, well-performing strategy was achieved with strategy P3–H2–R5, both when
compared against a locally constructed benchmark and compared against a global benchmark–
the MSCI World–that is well-recognized as the reference index for many internationally fo-
cused mutual funds.
The portfolio is dominated by US stock listings—with 18 companies listed in the USA, three
in Japan, and one in each of Canada, Denmark, France, Norway, and Sweden. Even though
the majority of the companies in the strategy belongs to the consumer cyclical and industrial
sector (as can be seen in table 6.23), it can still be said that all the portfolio alternatives studied
in this thesis have an international, non-sector-specific focus. Using a global benchmark as the
comparison is, therefore, a good decision. Hence, when studying strategy P3–H2–R5–LCY-G,
it can be concluded that higher returns are achieved with less volatility than the benchmark.
76
Table 6.23: Investment pool with corresponding sector and country expo-
sure for strategy P3–H2–R5. The † symbol indicates that the stock stopped
trading during the investment period.
Sector Companies Names
Basic materials 4 ArcelorMittal Dofasco Inc. (Canada)†; Reliance Steel & Aluminium
(USA); UFP Industries Inc. (USA); Vulcan Materials Co. (USA)
Communication services 0
Consumer cyclical 9 H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB. (Sweden); Harley-Davidson Inc.
(USA); Kate Spade & Co LLC (USA)†; Kellwood Co LLC (USA)†;
Leggett & Platt Inc (USA); NIKE Inc. (USA); PulteGroup Inc. (USA);
SEB SA (France); Thor Industries Inc (USA)
Consumer defensive 1 Orkla ASA (Norway)
Energy 0
Financial services 0
Healthcare 2 Becton Dickinson and Co. (USA); Novo Nordisk A/S (Denmark)
Industrials 6 Cintas Corp (USA); Illinois Tool Works Inc. (USA); Molex LLC
(USA)†; Parker.Hannifin Corp. (USA); Secon Co Ltd (Japan); WW
Grainger Inc. (USA);
Real estate 1 Centex LLC (USA)†
Technology 3 Intel Corp (USA); Nomura Research Institute Ltd (Japan); Rohm Co
Ltd (Japan)
Utilities 0
6.5 The Chosen Strategy’s ESG Risk Exposure
Table 6.24: ESG risk summary of strategy P3–H2–R5–LCY-G (Sustaina-
lytics, 2021a).
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max Mean Global average NA
14.8 17.5 21.2 28.9 48.7 24.6 22.3 5
Table 6.25: ESG risk classification of strategy P3–H2–R5–LCY-G (Sus-
tainalytics, 2021a).
Neglibible risk Low risk Medium risk High risk Severe risk NA
0 9 8 2 2 5
Although the portfolio has a large representation of sectors that are often considered ESG-
unfriendly—according to Sustainalytics (2021a)—the portfolio investments does not deviate
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much from the global average and are primarily classified as low or medium risk as per 2021.
As can be seen from table 6.24 and 6.25, last updated April 15th 2021, the global Sustainalytics
universe of 13,829 companies has an average ESG risk 22.3, while the portfolio (ignoring
missing values for five of the companies) has an average ESG risk score of 24.6.
Two companies in particular—Reliance Steel & Aluminium Co. and Leggett & Platt Inc.—
increases the mean substantially with ESG risk scores of 43.9 and 48.7, respectively. However,
while these are the only two companies in the portfolio being labeled as having a severely high
ESG risk, the risk is representing their industry more than the company. Specifically, Reliance
Steel & Aluminium Co. and Leggett & Platt Inc. are ranked 49th and 68th in their industries
containing 144 and 109 companies, respectively1.
Table 6.26: Absolute ESG rankings of companies in strategy P3–H2–R5–
LCY-G.
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max Mean Global universe NA
956 1816 3422 7343 13,138 4946 13,829 5
Considering the portfolio as a whole, the portfolio performs well on Sustainalytics’ rankings.
Specifically, out of 13,829 companies in the database, the portfolio at large has a mean ranking
ranking of 4946 and a median rank of 3422. If the mean represents the portfolio at large,
the portfolio would therefore rank among the top 36 % performers in the universe. The best-
performer ESG-wise has a rank of 956 (Nomura Research Institute Ltd.), whereas the worst
performer (Leggett & Platt Inc.) has a rank of 13,138. These numbers place Nomura among
the highest 7% ranked companies and Leggett & Platt among the lowest 5% ranked companies
in Sustainalytics’ global universe.
Table 6.27: ESG industry rankings of companies in strategy P3–H2–R5–
LCY-G.
Min 1Q Median 3Q Max Mean NA
Industry rank 4 24 46 113 295 73,3 5
Relative industry rank (%) 2.40 5.71 24.16 44.44 62.39 28.42 5
When studying each company’s ESG risk exposure against the peers of their respective indus-
tries in table 6.27, the results improve further. Specifically, the mean rank within the industry
is among the 28.42 % best ranked companies, and the median rank is lower with 24.16 %. The
1On May 24th 2021, Sustainalytics updated their review of Reliance Steel & Aluminium, in which it now
ranks 12th in the industry with a low-risk score of 18.7 (Sustainalytics, 2021b). Hence, of the two initial severe
ESG risk companies in the portfolio, only Leggett & Platt Inc. remains.
78
worst industry-specific performer is Leggett & Platt with is 68th position of 109 peers, whereas
the best performer (W.W. Grainger Inc.) ranks the best both on an absolute and a relative level
within the industry with an industry rank of 4 among all 167 traders and distributors.
Although certain companies in the portfolio contribute negatively to the ESG risk exposure, it
is fair to say that the chosen portfolio provide a generally low-to-medium ESG risk, and that
some of these companies are among the ESG lodestars within their industries. Therefore, it can
be concluded that the outperforming results provided by strategy P3–H2–R5 does not come at
the expense of ESG considerations.
6.6 The Efficient Frontier
Throughout the thesis, all portfolio strategies involve having the same investment weight into
each company. However, risk-averse investors prefer to achieve a given level of return at the
lowest risk possible, and investing an equal amount into each company may not achieve this
aim. Therefore, it is relevant to study the efficient frontier and the corresponding weights into
the portfolio companies to explore how far away from the efficient frontier that the chosen
strategy P3–H2–R5–LCY-G actually is.
Figure 6.22: The efficiency frontier, global benchmark, and explored
strategies.
Figure 6.22 illustrates the efficient frontier of strategy P3–H1–R1–LCY-G. 100,000 randomized
portfolio weights were drawn, and every company in the portfolio is required to have at least
some amounts invested since they were all part of the portfolio. While it would be favourable
to illustrate the efficient frontier for the chosen strategy, P3–H2–R5–LCY-G, it would take
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considerable rewriting of the necessary R code to produce an accurate frontier for a strategy
that both reinvests funds to the remaining portfolio and also involves rebalancing. Hence, as a
simplification, the efficient frontier for the related strategy P3–H1–R1, with the same portfolio
investment but a hold–index and no rebalancing strategy is analyzed and visualized.
The strategy performances are also highlighted in the plot. The pink dot represents the global
benchmark with the same target weights that were applied throughout this chapter for pricing
strategy P3, with an annual return of 6.4 % and a standard deviation of 18.4%. The 11 black
dots represent the portfolio strategies that were analyzed in this chapter. As the figure shows,
every strategy outperforms the global benchmark in terms of average annual return, and almost
all of the 11 strategies deliver higher average returns at the expense of higher risk. However, one
of these strategies—P3–H3–R1–LCY–G—also dominates the global benchmark by providing
a lower standard deviation and higher annual return, while all the other strategies give a higher
standard deviation and a higher annual return. Hence, a risk-averse investor would not have
chosen to invest in the global benchmark considering the fact that the global benchmark is
dominated by one of the strategies. However, which of the other strategies to choose depends,
among others, on the investor’s level of risk aversion.
Moreover, the selected portfolio strategy P3–H2–R5–LCY–G is encircled with a border line in
figure 6.22. Among all strategies, both this strategy and strategy P4–H1–R1–LCY–G provide
the highest Sharpe ratio of 0.55, and they are tangent with the black line.
However, each of the evaluated strategies are far from being efficient, which is illustrated by
their distance to the efficient frontier. The reason for this is primarily because of equal weight-
ing of the portfolio investments, while the weights along the efficient frontier differ substan-
tially. For instance, the optimal risk portfolio has a portfolio weight standard deviation of 3.66
percentage points. Since the average is 4.76 percentage points, the weights vary substantially.
By allowing the weights in the portfolio to differ, the portfolio would have moved closer to the
efficient frontier and consequently calls for future research to be conducted if future cohorts
deliver promising results similar to what have been found in this thesis.
Additionally, despite the fact that the efficient frontier was produced with strategy P3–H1–R1
and only 100,000 samples were drawn, two important insights can be drawn from the efficient
frontier. First, the minimum-variance portfolio achieves an average annual return of 13.4 %
with a standard deviation of 15.9. With a risk-free rate of 2.64 %, the Sharpe ratio in the
minimum-variance portfolio is 0.68. Second, the boundary point to the CAL gives the highest
Sharpe ratio of all the portfolio combinations. This portfolio gives a return of 15.6 % per year
and a standard deviation of 16.4 %, which results in a Sharpe ratio of 0.79. These number stand
in stark contrast with the recommended strategy P3–H2–R5, which delivers a Sharpe ratio of
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0.55 from an average of 14.3 % return at a standard deviation of 21.2 %.
Table 6.28: Strategies’ risk–return performances and corresponding Sharpe
ratios. All except the four strategies highlighted with • deliver higher re-
turns for higher levels of risk. Standard deviation and average numbers in
percent, and portfolios delivering the highest Sharpe ratios are highlighted
with an asterisk.
Strategy Std deviation Average Sharpe ratio
P3–H3–R1–LCY–G 18.3 7.9 0.29
P3–H3–R1–LCY–G 18.3 7.9 0.29
P1–H1–R1–LCY–G 18.6 9.7 0.38
P4–H1–R1–LCY–G 19.1 13.2 ⇤0.55
P3–H1–R1–LCY–G• 20.1 12.5 0.49
P2–H1–R1–LCY–G• 20.3 11.8 0.45
P3–H2–R1–LCY–G• 20.3 13.0 0.51
P3–H2–R5–LCY–G 21.2 14.3 ⇤0.55
P3–H2–R2–LCY–G 22.3 14.5 0.53
P3–H2–R4–LCY–G• 22.4 14.2 0.52
P3–H2–R3–LCY–G 23.1 14.7 0.52
6.7 The Chosen Strategy’s Currency Exposure
Throughout the thesis thus far, all investments have been valued and measured against their
local currency. However, for any investor, measuring each investment in a local currency is
inaccurate as long as the portfolio contains investments in multiple countries, which is the mo-
tivation for the international CAPM model. Hence, this section will study the main differences
in portfolio performance that occurs when assuming the investor is running the investment
portfolio from a certain country.
Table 6.29 studies performance differences between the local currency (LCY), Norwegian
Crowns (NOK), and the currencies of four major finance centres of the world—New York
(USD), Frankfurt (EUR), Zürich (Switzerland), and London (GBP). In other words, it is as-
sumed that a portfolio is operated from any of these five locations, measuring the portfolio
value through any of their corresponding currencies.
Table 6.29: Currency performance evaluation of strategy P3–H2–R5.
Annual returns
Ticker Min 1Q Median 3Q Max Mean HPR CAGR
USD –34.44 3.93 16.64 23.35 44.51 14.32 474.89 12.37
NOK –35.79 3.59 16.23 22.88 44.06 13.43 395.12 11.25
EUR –35.16 3.88 16.38 23.15 44.54 13.90 444.00 11.95
CHF –34.02 4.19 16.44 23.32 44.82 14.30 477.12 12.40
GBP –35.57 3.76 16.35 23.17 44.41 13.82 433.64 11.81
LCY –34.59 3.93 16.64 23.30 44.46 14.29 471.42 12.32
81
Table 6.29 shows primarily two interesting findings.
First, the summary statistics of annual returns show no large differences across the various
currencies, with the exception that USD and CHF delivered equally high mean annual returns
as LCY whereas the other three currencies delivered a markedly lower (but still high) mean
return. This is a promising result because it indicates that the selected portfolio is still able
to outperform the market despite the large currency fluctuations that occurred with certain
currency pairs, such as USD–EUR, over the last 15 years.
Second, although there are mostly smaller differences within the summary statistics of annual
returns, it is important to remember that these returns compound over a 15-year period. Hence,
seemingly small differences in the annual returns may cause larger changes in the holding
period return. Table 6.29 shows that this is indeed the case, with the HPR ranging from 395.12
% when nominated in NOK to 477.12 % when nominated in CHF. When annualizing these
returns, a portfolio nominated in NOK delivered 11.25 %, whereas a portfolio nominated in
CHF delivered 12.40 % annually. Compared to the local currency, only portfolios nominated
in USD and CHF achieved approximately the same total return, whereas portfolios nominatedd
in NOK, EUR, and GBP delivered reduced results.
Consequently, while the choice of location and corresponding currency does have some effect
in nominal returns, the differences are not large enough to pose a large risk for strategy P3–
H2–R5. Nevertheless, if a location should be chosen, then operating the 2006 cohort of the
selected strategy from Switzerland would have provided the highest nominal returns in the in-
vestment period January 1st 2006 to December 31st 2020. Hence, strategy P3–H2–R5–CHF–G
has presented itself as the preferred one for the 2006 cohort.
6.8 Analyzing All 960 Strategy Alternatives
A final relevant question is how sensitive the performance measures are to different pricing,
holding, rebalancing, benchmark, and currency alternatives when tested against many alterna-
tives. The main findings of the key metrics are summarized as follows.
First, the information ratio performs consistently well across currencies, benchmarks, and re-
balancing strategies. However, holding strategy H1 and H2 delivers consistently high informa-
tion ratios with a median value of 0.71 and 0.72 across all strategy alternatives, respectively.
With these holding strategies, no portfolios delivered a negative information ratio. Moreover,
all pricing strategies except for P1 deliver consistently high results, whereas P1 ranges from an
information ratio of –0.58 to 0.26. Hence, from the perspective of achieving a high information
ratio, it is advisable to choose any pricing strategy besides P1 and the holding strategy H1 or
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H2.
Second, the alpha is particularly sensitive to the choice of rebalancing strategy and in the neg-
ative direction. This is largely caused by pricing strategy P1, which consists of a high ratio of
consistently underperforming investments. Interestingly, only rebalancing strategy R5 avoids
this problem, demonstrating its usefulness. With rebalancing strategy R5, the worst achieved
alpha out of all strategy alternatives still achieves a positive alpha (0.01 %), whereas the highest
achieved alpha was 7.57 %. Additionally, both holding strategy H1 or H2 also produce posi-
tive alpha values across all alternatives. Hence, from achieving a high alpha, it is advisable to
choose rebalancing strategy R5 and holding strategy H1 or H2.
Third, the beta is not particularly variable to a group of strategies, but is particularly variable to
pricing strategy P1 and holding strategy H3. Interestingly, many strategies can achieve a beta of
approximately 0, which are all caused by choosing pricing strategy P1. Moreover, the highest
beta values typically occur for pricing strategy P4, holding strategy H1 and H2, and rebalancing
strategy R5 with mean beta values of 0.93, 0.89, 0.88, and 0.90, respectively. These values are
generally lower than the beta of the chosen strategy P3–H2–R5.
In short, testing all 960 alternatives indicates that to achieve the highest information ratio and
alpha, strategy H1 or H2 should be chosen. Additionally, there are indications that any pricing
strategy except P1, in addition to rebalancing strategy R5 delivers good results. However, these
choices comes at the cost of higher volatility, although the volatility is less than the return





This thesis aimed to answer the research question, “Are companies that meet Graham’s SEEDS
criteria delivering a risk-adjusted excess return, and does a Graham–Munger investment style
produce any improved performance?”
Two key considerations have been kept in mind to answer the research question. First, to
explore if companies respecting the SEEDS criteria perform consistently well across a range of
investment strategies to avoid cherry-picking strategies. The research question was attempted
to answer by studying a range of strategies across multiple pricing, holding, and rebalancing
strategies in detail, with an extra focus on the choice of currencies and comparisons against two
benchmarks. All portfolios showed promising results—confirming the first part of the research
question—although multiple strategies had structural weaknesses, as discussed in the results
chapter.
The second key consideration was to identify one strategy that performs well and is general
enough to be tested on future cohorts with hopefully similar results. Therefore, the chosen strat-
egy was P3–H2–R5, or P3–H2–R5–CHF-G if currency and choice of the benchmark are also
included. This strategy involves investing equal amounts in all companies that meet the SEEDS
criteria, which fits with Munger’s investment style, except for those with unnaturally high or
low price criterion scores. Moreover, the strategy involves holding the portfolio throughout
the entire investment period and adhering to Munger’s investment style. If a company stops
trading for a particular reason, the sales proceeds were reinvested into the portfolio and not the
index. Additionally, the portfolio is rebalanced annually, but the lower 25 % performers are
not rebalanced to protect the defensive investor from continuously pouring large amounts into
companies that constantly underperform.
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For the 2006 cohort, strategy P3–H2–R5 outperformed the market substantially along with all
reported metrics, delivering higher returns with 26 investments at lower risk than the market
when compared against a global benchmark. Against the global benchmark using a local cur-
rency, the strategy delivered an annual alpha of 7.30 %, which was produced primarily because
of a high portfolio CAGR of 12.32 %, a decent but not impressive benchmark CAGR of 5.20 %,
and a low beta of 0.93. The total holding period return over 15 years was 471.4 %, whereas
the benchmark’s holding period return was 113.9 %. Moreover, the portfolio outperformed
consistently well throughout the investment period, delivering an information ratio of 0.93,
outperforming the market in 11 of the 15 years (AOR of 73.3 %), and delivering a positive
cumulative excess return for 83.3 % of the days in the investment horizon. This steady perfor-
mance was positively affected by the rebalancing strategy—achieving a rebalancing bonus of
89 basis points—albeit at the expense of a slightly worse AOR. Although no thorough analysis
of bull and bear markets was undertaken, the strategy generally outperformed the benchmark
in bull periods and performed equally well during the bear periods.
Moreover, the strategy achieved this result without being heavily exposed to any single asset.
Specifically, due to annual rebalancing of the top 75 % performers, the largest asset exposure
at any point in time was 9.43 %, which is approximately 2.5 times higher than the asset target
weight. Operating a portfolio from the preferred country, Switzerland did not pose large per-
formance effects due to currency fluctuations, either, with the portfolio CAGR increased from
12.32 % to 12.40 % when the chosen currency was implemented.
Finally, although there are multiple high and severe ESG-risk companies in the portfolio, the
portfolio poses no immediate concern from an ESG perspective as most companies belonged
in the low- or medium-risk category. Since this strategy also performed better than most port-
folios and the benchmark—with additional risk-adjusted returns being possible to achieve if
discarding the equal-weighting principle—the second part of the research question has been
confirmed.
However, while the strategy performed well for the 2006 cohort, it is still important not to get
overly excited about the results. Most importantly, similar results with the same investment
strategy may not be achieved when applied to later cohorts. Although a general investment
strategy was chosen in the hopes of avoiding an overfitting strategy, the strategy still has a large
exposure to the USA, with almost 70 % of the initial investments being stock-listed in the USA.
Additionally, the strategy was heavily exposed to consumer cyclicals and industrials, in partic-
ular, two sectors that represented 58 % of the initial investments. Hence, the performance of
an equal-weight portfolio against a global benchmark could be heavily affected by the general
performance both in the US stock market and within these two sectors.
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The efficient market hypothesis—particularly the semi-strong form—also indicates that outper-
forming the market in future cohorts should not be possible. On the other hand, Warren Buffett
is a strong advocate that there are frequent inefficiencies in the market that can be exploited
because the prices are ultimately set by the person who is the most emotional, the greediest,
or the most depressed—and that it is challenging, then, to argue that the market is rationally
priced (Buffett, 1984). Buffett goes further, saying, “Ships will sail around the world, but the
Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and
value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper”
(Buffett, 1984, p. 15).
Ultimately, the empirical findings from this thesis cannot conclude in either direction. Instead,
more research needs to be conducted on future cohorts before anything conclusive can be said
about this investment strategy. For the time being, then, the results from investing strategy
P3–H2–R5 should be treated as a mere hypothesis for further testing.
Fittingly enough, Munger’s investment philosophy—to invest by “sitting on your ass”—forms
the acronym SOYA. Hence, I want to propose that the selected investing strategy P3–H2–R5
gets the more personal name “the SOYA SEEDS investment strategy”. This name then refers to
the strategy of Sitting On Your Ass investing in all companies meeting requirements of Size,
Earnings stability, Earnings growth, Dividend records, and Strong financial conditions—except
for those with an unnaturally high or low price criterion score. Additionally, reinvestments
are done into the remaining portfolio, and all but the lowest 25 % performers are rebalanced
annually. Then the SOYA SEEDS strategy is the hypothesis that will be tested on multiple future
cohorts to ultimately identify whether the efficient market hypothesis or its critics may prevail
in this branch of the value investing research tree.
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